基于多任务委托代理模型的物流服务供应链激励机制研究  

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Logistics Service Supply Chain Based on Multi-task Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：李晨阳 朱卫平[1] 王兴茹 LI Chen-yang;ZHU Wei-ping;WANG Xing-ru(School of Air Transportation,Shanghai University of Engineering Science,Shanghai 201620;China Coal Technology and Engineering Group Shanghai Ltd,Shanghai 200030,China)

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学航空运输学院,上海201620 [2]中国煤炭科工集团上海有限公司,上海200030

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2021年第4期69-72,共4页Logistics Engineering and Management

摘　　要：物流服务集成商与物流服务提供商之间存在信息不对称,容易导致物流服务提供商的违规行为。物流服务集成商和物流服务提供商之间的关系属于典型的委托-代理关系,传统的单任务委托代理得出的结论有限,无法应对复杂的实际情况。因此,文中从三个任务的角度出发,从订单数量、降低物流成本、物流服务质量考虑了物流服务集成商对物流服务提供商的激励,分析激励效果弱化的原因,完善相关的激励理论。There is information asymmetry between logistics service integrators and logistics service providers,which can easily lead to violations of logistics service providers.The relationship between logistics service integrators and logistics service providers belongs to a typical principal-agent relationship.The traditional single-task principal-agent relationship has limited conclusions and cannot deal with complex practical situations.Therefore,from the perspective of three tasks,this article considers the incentives of logistics service integrators to logistics service providers from the number of orders,reducing logistics costs,and logistics service quality,analyze the reasons for the weakening of incentive effects and improve relevant incentive theories.

关 键 词：物流服务供应链 多任务委托代理 激励机制 主观评价 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]