拥堵收费和可交易路票策略的建模与对比分析  

Modeling and Comparative Analysis of Road Pricing and Tradable Driving Credit Strategies

作　　者：张南[1] 梁霄[1] 叶彭姚[1] ZHNAG Nan;LIANG Xiao;YE Pengyao(School of Transportation and Logistics,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 611756,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学,交通运输与物流学院,四川成都611756

出　　处：《综合运输》2021年第4期33-40,共8页China Transportation Review

摘　　要：近些年来一些反对者认为拥堵收费损害了社会公平,而可交易路票是研究者为缓解交通拥挤问题而提出的另一种可以替代拥堵收费的控制策略。因此,本文为研究哪种策略更有助于解决拥挤问题,以伦敦拥堵收费案例为基础建立了系统动态模型并对基础模型进行了扩展,然后建立了三种政策场景并根据旅行起点和人均收入水平进行出行者特征分组。最后,考虑选择出行效用,社会福利和减少的车辆行驶里程来评估政策的有效性和公平性。结论表明,两个策略都可以有效缓解交通拥堵,但拥堵收费会损害低收入旅客的利益和社会福利;可交易路票策略能够大大提高公共交通用户的效用并保证大多数旅客的利益不受损害甚至达到更好的个人状态。In recent years,some opponents believe that road pricing is harmful to social equity,and tradable driving credit is another control strategy proposed by researchers to alleviate traffic congestion.Therefore,this paper established a system dynamic model based on London Congestion Charge case and expand the base model after that in order to study which strategy is more effective to alleviate congestion,and then set up three scenarios and classified the travellers according to the trip starting point and per capita income level.Finally,the effectiveness and fairness of the two policies are evaluated by considering travel utility,social welfare and reduced vehicle mileage.The results show that both strategies can effectively alleviate traffic congestion,but road pricing will damage the interests and social welfare of low-income passengers;tradable driving credit strategy can greatly improve the utility of public transport users and ensure that the interests of most passengers will not be damaged or even achieve better personal status.

关 键 词：可交易路票 拥堵收费 系统动力学 公平性 社会福利 

分 类 号：U491.2[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]