康德对人格同一性的批判:一种基于逻辑语义分析的解释  

Kant’s Critique of Personal Identity:An Interpretation Based on Logic-Semantic Analysis

作　　者：罗喜 Luo Xi(Humboldt University of Berlin,Department of Philosophy 10099)

机构地区：[1]柏林洪堡大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学评论》2018年第2期41-57,共17页Wuda Philosophical Review

摘　　要：本文旨在凭借当代语言分析哲学的方法,以一种全新的视角解释康德对理性心理学人格性谬误推理的批判。文章首先分析当今康德研究中两种具有代表性的理解(斯特劳森和克勒默),指出解释的缺陷,并试图重构康德的论证来弥补其不足。基于康德手稿中的不同文本,我将主张,在人格性谬误推理中,中项的歧义可以通过对“我”概念进行逻辑语义分析而清晰地揭示出来。理性心理学人格性谬误推理的根本错误就在于,把不指称对象而单纯表达思维逻辑主体的逻辑同一性的“我”当作了一个有对象指涉且具有实在同一性的精神实体。Based on methods of contemporary analytical philosophy of language,this paper aims to clarify Kant’s critique of the paralogism of personality in rational psychology from a new perspective.First,I will analyze two famous interpretations in Kant-Literature(Peter F.Strawson and Heiner F.Klemme),pointing out defects of their explanation,and try to make up for the deficiency by reconstructing Kant’s own arguments.According to different texts in Kant’s manuscripts,I will argue that the ambiguity of the middle term in the paralogism of personality of rational psychology can clearly be revealed by spelling out the logic-semantic statue of the concept of“I”.The fundamental error of rationalpsychological paralogism on personality lies in the fact that the“I”,which simply does not refer to an object and merely expresses the logical identity of the logical subject of thinking,is regarded as a spiritual substance with object reference and real identity.

关 键 词：第三谬误推理 逻辑同一性 人格同一性 逻辑语义分析 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学]