分配正义理论如何容纳“最大化原则”  

How Can a Theory of Distributive Justice Incorporate the Maximum Principle

作　　者：朱佳峰 Zhu Jiafeng(Sun Yet-Sen University)

机构地区：[1]中山大学中国公共管理研究中心 [2]中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院,广州市510275

出　　处：《哲学评论》2020年第2期202-219,共18页Wuda Philosophical Review

摘　　要：葛四友教授在《分配正义新论》中试图对分配正义理论作一个后果论重构。本文将论证:(1)葛四友未能有效辩护作为重构正义理论之基础的后果论道德观,恰当地理解人的观念和道德的功能,对道德原则只能作义务论式的说明;(2)在一个基于义务论道德观的分配正义理论中,我们仍然能够以及应该以某种方式吸收最大化原则。这样设想的社会正义原则回应了后果论同情者的一个重要直觉:在对法律与公共政策的设计与评判中,“最大化后果”似乎是一个非常重要的考量。In his A New Account of Distributive Justice,Prof.Siyou Ge attempts to offer a consequentialist reconstruction of distributive theory.In this paper I will first argue that Prof.Ge fails to offer a valid defense of consequentialism for his reconstruction project;instead I will defend a deontological account of morality,based on a proper understanding of the conception of person and the function of morality.Second,I argue that a theory of distributive justice based on deontological morality nonetheless can and should incorporate the maximum principle in a particular way.Such a theory of distributive justice can therefore respond to one seemingly irresistible intuition,namely,in designing and evaluating law and public policies“,maximizing consequence”matters.

关 键 词：义务论 后果论 最大化后果 自然正义 社会正义 

分 类 号：B82-061[哲学宗教—伦理学]