后果论正义观与人道主义的失败结盟——评《分配正义新论:人道与公平》  

A Failed Alliance of Humanitarianism and Consequentialism:On A New Account of Distributive Justice:Humaneness and Fairness

作　　者：惠春寿[1] Hui Chunshou(East China Normal University)

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学哲学系,上海市200241

出　　处：《哲学评论》2020年第2期236-247,共12页Wuda Philosophical Review

摘　　要：葛四友教授在《分配正义新论:人道与公平》(以下简称《分配正义新论》)中提出了一种后果论的正义原则,这种原则的独特之处在于,它不仅充分尊重有限利他心这一人性所固有的动机约束,而且基于人道主义情感为基本需要原则提供了辩护。本文认为,《分配正义新论》只是解释了正义原则需要尊重有限利他心的动机约束,没有解释正义原则必须诉诸人道主义的情感进行建构。不仅如此,由于人道主义情感和后果论之间存在明显的冲突,《分配正义新论》需要通过为人道主义情感提供后果论式的证成来化解这些冲突,但通过考察并反驳《分配正义新论》中可能存在的四种证成路径,本文揭示了它无法成功地把人道主义情感和后果论整合为一套融贯的正义理论。In A New Account of Distributive Justice:Humaneness and Fairness,Siyou Ge proposes a distinct consequentialist theory of justice which fully accommodates the limited altruistic motives on the one hand and elaborates the basic needs principle on the basis of humanitarianism on the other hand.This article argues that Siyou’s consequentialist theory of justice stands in need of a sufficient explanation for the appealing to humanitarianism,because there are apparent conflicts between the partiality of humanitarian assistance and consequentialist impartiality.Furthermore,this article examines four possible arguments for the coherence between humanitarianism and consequentialism in Siyou’s theory,and refute them in turn.It concludes that Siyou’s efforts to make an alliance with humanitarianism is failed.

关 键 词：分配正义 后果论 人道主义 有限利他心 

分 类 号：B82-061[哲学宗教—伦理学]