产权博弈:演化与行为视角  

Property Game: Evolution and Behavioral Perspectives

作　　者：董志强[1] Dong Zhiqiang

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学经济与管理学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《社会科学战线》2021年第5期73-83,281,F0002,共13页Social Science Front

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71973048)。

摘　　要：人们为何会尊重他人的产权?形成产权尊重的条件是什么?此类问题应立于产权博弈分析的中心。文章系统回顾了思想史和当代行为演化范式经济学对此问题的回答,认为需要改变看待产权博弈的视角。经济意义上的产权,是社会博弈的结果,而不是它的前提;将产权视为随现代文明兴起的人类社会建构的习惯看法,是一种误识;作为自发社会秩序的自然产权之形成,有深刻的生物性原因(如禀赋效应心理倾向),它们会对政府使用强力界定和保护产权形成一定约束。经济治理中的产权保护实践需要考虑这些自发秩序的力量。Why do people respect other peoples property rights? What are the conditions for forming respect for property rights? This kind of questions should be placed at the center of property right game analysis. After systematically reviewing the answers to this questions from the history of ideas and contemporary behavioral evolution paradigm economics,this paper argues that it is necessary to change the perspective of property rights game. Property rights in the economic sense are the result of social game,not the premise of it;The conventional view of property rights as the construction of human society with the rise of modern civilization is a misconception;As a spontaneous social order,there are profound biological reasons for the formation of natural property rights( such as the psychological tendency of endowment effect),which may restrict the government to use might to define and protect property rights. The practice of property rights protection in economic governance needs to consider these forces of spontaneous order.

关 键 词：产权 演化博弈 行为经济学 制度经济分析 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]