管理层权力对管理层薪酬的影响——基于无实际控制人上市公司的PSM检验  

The influence of management power on management compensation——PSM test based on listed companies without actual controller

作　　者：于培友[1] 牛晓童 张美玲 YU Pei-you;NIU Xiao-tong;ZHANG Mei-ling(College of Economics and Management,Qingdao University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266061,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛科技大学经济与管理学院,山东青岛266061

出　　处：《青岛科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2021年第2期60-67,共8页Journal of Qingdao University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：山东省重点研发计划(软科学项目)(2020RKB01710)。

摘　　要：管理层权力是解释管理层薪酬的重要理论,有无实际控制人是制约管理层权力的重要因素。运用PSM方法对比有无实际控制人对管理层薪酬的影响,结果表明,无实际控制人公司的管理层薪酬显著高于有实际控制人公司的管理层薪酬,而且第一大股东持股比例低、董事长总经理兼任会提高管理层权力,使得管理层薪酬更高。对无实际控制人公司的研究表明,管理层高薪酬成了代理问题的表现形式而非解决方式,从而验证了管理层权力理论。在我国股权结构分散的上市公司占比不断提高的背景下,加强管理层薪酬的治理以缓解代理问题愈发重要。Management power is an important theory to explain the compensation of management,and whether there are actual controllers is an important factor to restrict the power of management.The PSM method is used to compare the influence of the actual controller on management compensation.The results show that the management compensation of companies without actual controllers is significantly higher than that of companies with actual controllers,moreover,the low shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder and the concurrent role of chairman and general manager will enhance the power of the management and make the remuneration of the management higher.Research on companies without actual controllers shows that high executive compensation is a manifestation of agency problem rather than a solution,thus verifying the theory of management power.In the context of the increasing proportion of listed companies with a decentralized shareholding structure in China,it is increasingly important to strengthen the governance of management compensation to alleviate agency problems.

关 键 词：管理层权力 管理层薪酬 无实际控制人 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]