校企合作中的信息不对称及治理机制设计  

Information Asymmetry in School-Enterprise Cooperation and Its Governance Mechanism Design

作　　者：尹江海[1] 程培堽[1] Yin Jianghai;Cheng Peigang

机构地区：[1]苏州农业职业技术学院党办,江苏苏州215008

出　　处：《江苏高教》2021年第7期50-55,共6页Jiangsu Higher Education

基　　金：江苏省2020年度高校哲学社会科学研究基金资助项目(2020SJA1485)。

摘　　要：目前校企合作遇到的困境之一是缺乏企业的深度参与,普遍存在"校热企冷"的现象。然而多项调查表明,绝大多数企业具有参与校企合作的意愿。运用计划行为理论分析表明,阻碍企业参与校企合作意愿转化为实际行为的重要因素是信息不对称。随后运用委托-代理理论深入分析了信息不对称在校企合作中的表现,及其对企业参与校企合作行为的影响。在此基础上,为改善企业参与校企合作行为,设计了校企合作中信息不对称的治理机制,包括信号传递机制、协议机制、信誉机制、监督机制、激励机制等。At present,one of the difficulties in school-enterprise cooperation is the lack of deep participation of enterprises,which is vividly dubbed as"school-hot but enterprise-cold".However,a number of surveys show that the vast majority of enterprises have the willingness to participate in school-enterprise cooperation.By applying the theory of planned behavior,the analysis shows that one of the important factors that hinder enterprises to participate in the cooperation is the information asymmetry.And the principal-agent theory is applied to analyze the traits of information asymmetry in school-enterprise cooperation and its influence on the behavior of enterprises participating in school-enterprise cooperation.Finally,in order to improve the behavior of enterprises participating in school-enterprise cooperation,the governance mechanism of information asymmetry in school-enterprise cooperation is designed,including signaling mechanism,agreement mechanism,reputation mechanism,supervision mechanism,incentive mechanism,etc.

关 键 词：校企合作 信息不对称 治理机制 

分 类 号：G710[文化科学—职业技术教育学]