高管激励与代理成本——基于上市公司的经验证据  

Incentive Mechanism for Senior Managers and Agency Costs——Empirical Evidence Based on Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：黄晓波[1] 吴豪 程歆芮 HUANG Xiao-bo;WU Hao;CHENG Xin-rui(Business School of Hubei University, Wuhan Hubei 430062)

机构地区：[1]湖北大学商学院,湖北武汉430062

出　　处：《湖南财政经济学院学报》2021年第4期27-35,共9页Journal of Hunan University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：湖北省哲学社会科学基金项目“治理结构、财务政策与公司价值”(项目编号:HBSK2018041)。

摘　　要：在新一轮深化国有企业改革大背景下,以2003年至2019年上海证券交易所与深圳证券交易所全部A股上市公司为研究对象,对薪酬激励和股权激励如何影响代理成本进行理论分析和实证检验,结果发现:高管激励具有“融资效应”,但不具有“营运效应”。高管激励在降低外部的财务费用(债务人代理成本)方面发挥了积极作用,但在降低内部的管理费用和销售费用(经理人代理成本)方面,薪酬激励和股权激励都没有发挥出积极作用。应提高高管激励强度,使高管的利益目标与股东的利益目标更紧密地联系在一起;完善高管激励机制,压缩高管通过在职消费、对外捐赠、非效率投资等方式谋求私利的空间;加强上市公司和资本市场监管,提高上市公司质量和资本市场效率,使股票价格能够充分地反映公司利润和股票价值。In the context of the new round of deepening reform of state-owned enterprises,taking all A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as research objects from 2003 to 2019,this paper makes the theoretical analyses and empirical tests on how the compensation incentive and stock option incentive affect the agency costs.The results show that the incentive mechanism for senior managers has"financing effect",but not"operation effect".The incentive mechanism for senior managers plays a positive role in reducing external financial costs(agent costs of debtors),however,the incentive mechanism for senior managers does not play a positive role in reducing internal management costs and sales costs(agent costs of managers).Therefore,it is necessary to enhance the incentive intensity of senior managers,so that the interest goals of senior managers and shareholders are more closely linked.We should strengthen the supervision of the listed companies and the capital market,and improve the quality of the listed companies and the efficiency of the capital market,so that the stock price can fully reflect the company's profits and stock value.

关 键 词：薪酬激励 股权激励 代理成本 融资效应 营运效应 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]