管理者能力、经济政策不确定性与并购商誉  

Managerial Ability,Uncertainty of Economic Policy and Goodwill from M&A Activities

作　　者：刘衡 袁天荣[2] LIU Heng;YUAN Tian-rong(School of Economics and Management,Hubei University of Technology,Wuhan 430068,China;School of Accounting,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China)

机构地区：[1]湖北工业大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430068 [2]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2021年第8期96-113,共18页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：湖北工业大学博士科研启动基金项目(BSQD2020084)。

摘　　要：基于不确定性理论,以2008-2017年沪深两市A股上市公司数据为研究样本,分析了管理者能力、经济政策不确定性与并购商誉之间的作用机制。研究结果表明,管理者能力越强,并购商誉越少;经济政策不确定性抑制了有能力的管理者发挥降低并购商誉的作用。进一步研究表明,权力寻租抑制了有能力的管理者在降低并购商誉中的作用,且在经济政策不确定性环境下表现得更明显。薪酬激励可能会诱发管理者夸大并购商誉,货币性薪酬占其年度薪酬比重较高的管理者更可能夸大并购商誉水平,且在经济政策不确定性较高时表现得更明显。Based on the uncertainty theory, this paper takes the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2008 to 2017 as the research sample, and analyzes the mechanism of the relationship between the ability of managers, the uncertainty of economic policy and the goodwill of M&A. The results show that, the stronger the manager′s ability is, the less the M&A goodwill is;the uncertainty of economic policy restrains the ability of managers from reducing the goodwill from M&A activities. Further research shows that power rent-seeking restrains the role of competent managers in reducing goodwill from M&A activities, and it is more obvious in the environment of economic policy uncertainty. Salary incentive may induce managers to exaggerate the goodwill from M&A activities, and managers with higher proportion of monetary salary in their annual salary are more likely to exaggerate the goodwill from M&A activities, which is more obvious when the uncertainty of economic policy is high.

关 键 词：管理者能力 经济政策不确定性 并购商誉 权力寻租 薪酬结构 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]