混合股权对高管薪酬粘性的影响研究——基于混合所有制改革的分析  

On the Impact of Mixed Equity on Executive Compensation Stickiness:Analysis Based on the Mixed Ownership Reform

作　　者：车嘉丽[1] 陈赞宇 CHE Jia-li;CHEN Zan-yu(Guangdong University of Financial and Economics,Guangzhou 510320,China)

机构地区：[1]广东财经大学,广东广州510320

出　　处：《广东财经大学学报》2021年第4期66-80,共15页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：以2008—2018年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,基于国有企业改制为混合所有制企业以及民营企业引入国有资本这两种不同的改革模式,考察混合股权对高管薪酬粘性的影响。研究结果显示,提高混合股权制衡度有助于抑制高管的薪酬粘性,其中在国有企业中提高非国有股权深入度、外资股权深入度对高管薪酬粘性的抑制效果更优,在民营企业中提高国有股权深入度有助于抑制高管薪酬粘性。进一步研究发现,非国有股权、外资股权深入度在国有相对控股企业更能抑制高管薪酬粘性,混合股权制衡度在两类企业中都能起到对高管薪酬粘性的抑制作用,民营股权深入度在两类企业中对高管薪酬粘性无显著影响。混合股权制衡度与国有股权深入度在民营家族企业和民营非家族企业中都能显著发挥对高管薪酬粘性的抑制作用。因此,应充分发挥混合股权制衡的作用,合理配置国有资本与非国有资本的比例,优化高管持股方案,破除垄断行业进入壁垒,实现产业开放。Taking the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2018 as the research object, based on the two different reform modes of state-owned enterprises restructuring into mixed ownership enterprises and private enterprises introducing state-owned capital, this paper investigates the impact of mixed equity on executive compensation stickiness.The results show that whether state-owned enterprises or private enterprises, improving the degree of mixed equity balance will help to restrain the executive compensation stickiness;in the state-owned enterprises, improving the depth of non-state-owned equity and foreign equity has better inhibition effect on executive compensation stickiness than that of private equity;in the private enterprises, improving the depth of state-owned equity also helps to inhibit executive compensation stickiness.Further research shows that, compared with state-owned enterprises, the depth of non-state-owned equity and foreign equity can inhibit executive compensation stickiness more;the degree of mixed equity balance can inhibit executive compensation stickiness in both types of enterprises. The depth of private equity has no significant effect on executive compensation stickiness in both types of enterprises.The degree of mixed equity balance and state-owned equity can also significantly inhibit executive compensation stickiness in private family enterprises and private non-family enterprises.Therefore, it is proposed to give full play to the role of mixed equity balance, rationally allocate the proportion of state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital, optimize the executive executive stock ownership plan, break the barriers to entry of monopoly industries to realize industrial opening-up.

关 键 词：混合所有制改革 股权结构 混合股权 异质股东 高管薪酬 薪酬粘性 高管持股 民营企业 国有股权 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F275.4[经济管理—国民经济]