公平偏好视角下生鲜供应链的批发价格契约与协调  

Wholesale Price Contract and Coordination of Agricultural Products Supply Chain under Different Fair Preference Models

作　　者：高瑛 王洁 王建华 GAO Ying;WANG Jie;WANG Jianhua(Business School,Jiangnan University,Wuxi 214122,China)

机构地区：[1]江南大学商学院,江苏无锡214122

出　　处：《物流科技》2021年第9期118-125,共8页Logistics Sci-Tech

基　　金：国家重点研发计划重点专项项目“食品安全大数据关键技术研究”(2018YFC1604000)。

摘　　要：研究零售商公平偏好行为如何影响供应商与零售商组成的二级生鲜农产品供应链协调,依据FS不公平厌恶模型刻画零售商具有不利与有利不公平厌恶心理下的效用函数,同时参考BO公平偏好模型,构建零售商不公平厌恶心理时的批发价格契约模型,分析零售商公平偏好对其生鲜农产品订货量以及供应商利润的影响。研究得出无论采用FS公平偏好模型还是BO公平偏好模型,批发价格契约皆可协调公平偏好零售商生鲜农产品供应链。FS模型下供应商利润比在BO模型下低。因此,供应商希望具有公平偏好零售商采用BO公平偏好模型。This paper studies how the retailer's fairness preference behavior affects the coordination of the two-level fresh agricultural products supply chain composed of suppliers and retailers.Based on the FS unfair aversion model,the utility function of retailers with adverse and favorable unfair aversion psychology is described.At the same time,referring to the BO fairness preference model,the wholesale price contract model of retailers with unfair aversion psychology is constructed,this paper analyzes the impact of retailer's fairness preference on the order quantity of fresh agricultural products and supplier's profit.The results show that the wholesale price contract can coordinate the fresh agricultural products supply chain of retailers with fair preference,no matter FS fair preference model or BO fair preference model is adopted.The profit of supplier in FS model is lower than that in BO model.Therefore,suppliers want retailers with fair preference to adopt BO fair preference model.

关 键 词：公平偏好 生鲜供应链 批发价格契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]