基于微分博弈的农产品供应链成员利他决策研究  

Study on Altruistic Decision-making of Agricultural Product Supply Chain MembersBased on Differential Game

作　　者：张悟移[1] 宗子怡 ZHANG Wu-yi;ZONG Zi-yi(Faculty of Management and Economics,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650093,China)

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,云南昆明650093

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2021年第9期57-64,共8页Logistics Engineering and Management

基　　金：中国工程院院地合作项目“云南茶叶产业发展战略研究”(2020YNZH6)。

摘　　要：文中采用微分博弈模型,针对农产品供应链中的农产品供应商、电商销售平台这两个成员,以质量稳定能力、质量提升技术等五个指标作为决策变量,考虑农产品供应链成员利他偏好,研究食品安全问题。分别讨论在不考虑利他偏好的自利决策、利他偏好下的分散决策和完全合作的集中决策三种情况下的农产品供应链质量水平随时间变化轨迹和收益均衡策略。仿真模拟结果可知:在利他偏好下的农产品供应链质量水平最高,并且供应链上成员的收益效果最好,成员可以通过调节质量影响系数和成本系数助力农产品供应链形成高质优价的状态。In this paper,a differential game model was used to study the food safety issue by considering the altruistic preference of members of the agricultural product supply chain,taking five indicators such as quality stability ability and quality improvement technology as decision variables for the two members of the agricultural product supply chain,namely,the agricultural product supplier and the e-commerce sales platform.The trajectory of the quality level of agricultural supply chain over time and the revenue equilibrium strategy were discussed under three conditions of self-interest decision without considering altruistic preference,decentralized decision with altruistic preference and centralized decision with complete cooperation.The simulation results show that the quality level of agricultural supply chain is the highest and meanwhile the members of the supply chain have the best benefit effect under altruistic preference,and members can adjust the quality influence coefficient and cost coefficient to help the agricultural supply chain form the state of high quality and high price.

关 键 词：利他偏好 微分博弈 农产品供应链 食品安全 政府激励机制 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]