身体行动为何是“心理事件”--心理因果难题的行动哲学解  

Why Do Physical Actions Belong to the“Mental Event”:A Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation from the Perspective of Philosophy of Action

作　　者：姜涛 JIANG Tao(College of Arts and Sciences,Shanghai Polytechnic University,Shanghai 201209,China)

机构地区：[1]上海第二工业大学文理学部,上海201209

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2021年第5期72-78,共7页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：上海高校青年教师资助计划项目(ZZEGD19018);上海第二工业大学校基金项目(EGD20XQD25)。

摘　　要：戴维森通常被视为行动因果论的代表人物,但对“心理事件”概念的分析表明,这一主流标签蕴含着严重误解。分析包括两部分:首先,在本体论承诺语境中,反思“事件”作为形而上个体的合法性;其次,对照摹状词理论,精确刻画谓词“心理的”。结合两个子概念,就能准确界定“心理事件”这一核心术语,避免因果论误读。误读的消除首先能够解释身体行动为何是“心理事件”,其次可以融贯解释戴维森对待“剩余问题”的奇异立场,最终有助于消解错置的心理因果性难题。Davidson is usually regarded as a representative of the causal theory of action,but by analysing the concept of“mental event”,it will be illustrated that this dominant label contains serious misunderstanding.The analysis consists of two parts:first,a reflection on the legitimacy of regarding“event”as a metaphysical individual in the context of the ontological commitment;second,a precise depiction of the predicate“mental”in comparison with the description theory.By combining these two sub-concepts,the key term“mental event”can be properly defined so that we can preclude the causal misinterpretation.The elimination of misinterpretation would firstly explain why“bodily action”is a“mental event”,then coherently explain Davidson’s paradoxical position on the“remainder problem”,and ultimately help to resolve the misplaced puzzle of mental causality.

关 键 词：心理事件 行动因果论 本体论承诺 摹状词 心理因果性 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]