市场控制还是组织控制——评国有企业向创新型企业转型的两种改革思路  

Market Control or Organizational Control:A Review of Two Reform Ideas for Transforming SOEs into Innovative Enterprises

作　　者：高岭 卢荻[3,4] 唐昱茵[5] LING GAO;DI LU;YUYIN TANG(School of Economics,Xiamen University;School of Economics,Renmin University of China;School of Economics,Fudan University)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济学院、王亚南经济研究院 [2]中国人民大学经济学院比较政治经济学研究中心 [3]中国人民大学经济学院 [4]中国人民大学比较政治经济学研究中心 [5]复旦大学经济学院

出　　处：《工信财经科技》2021年第4期94-106,共13页Review of Financial & Technological Economics

摘　　要：本文评述了国有企业转型的两种改革思路。第一种是市场控制导向的改革思路,把重点放在解决“内部人控制”导致的代理成本和国家所有权导致的预算软约束问题。为实现国有资产保值增值的目标,这个改革思路的主导思想是打造中国版的“淡马锡模式”。第二种是组织控制导向的改革思路,把重点放在企业的组织学习能力和生产过程的控制,其局限性在于低估了内部人控制的代理成本。本文认为这两种改革思路都存在不足,“淡马锡模式”在中国行不通,借鉴美国的养老金管理模式会更贴切。如果把组织控制导向的创新型企业理论整合到利益相关者理论,通过董事会再造和企业民主制度完善,可能是创新型国有企业的理想的治理模式。This paper reviews two reform ideas for transforming state-owned enterprises(SOEs).The first approach is the market-control-oriented reform idea,which focuses on solving the agency cost caused by"insider control"and the soft budget constraint caused by state ownership.In order to achieve the goal of preserving the value of state-owned assets,the main idea of this reform is to create a Chinese version of the Temasek model.The second approach is the organizational-control-oriented reform idea,which focuses on the organizational learning capability and the control of the production process.This paper argues that both reform approaches are inadequate and that the Temasek model will not work in China.If the organizational-controloriented innovative enterprise theory could be integrated with the stakeholder theory,it may be the ideal governance model for innovative SOEs through the reengineering of the board of directors and the improvement of corporate democracy.

关 键 词：国有企业 技术创新 市场控制 组织控制 淡马锡模式 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F276.1[经济管理—国民经济]