负激励和延期支付对绩效的影响——基于一项实验  

The Effects of Negative Incentives and Delay in Payment on Performance:An Experiment

作　　者：刘俊勇[1] 段文譞 孙瑞琦 王康 JUNYONG LIU;WENXUAN DUAN;RUIQI SUN;KANG WANG

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院、中国管理会计发展与研究中心 [2]中央财经大学会计学院 [3]首都经济贸易大学会计学院 [4]中国国际技术智力合作集团有限公司

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2021年第1期131-152,共22页China Accounting Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(11BGL027);财政部会计名家培养工程的资助。

摘　　要：薪酬合同设计合理与否,不但关系到企业的整体财务绩效,而且关系到每个职工的切身利益。本文通过实验研究,将负激励和延期支付机制引入原有薪酬计划,观察其对绩效的影响。本文发现,在一般线性预算薪酬合同中加入负激励或延期支付机制,能够切实提升绩效并降低单位人工成本。本文运用实验研究的方法,基于心理学理论和管理会计学的视角,探讨不同的薪酬合同对个人任务绩效的激励效果,为负激励和延期支付的作用效果提供直接的经验证据,为企业如何在薪酬激励中运用负激励和延期支付提供理论指导。The reasonability of compensation contract design not only influences the financial performance of the organization,but also the vital interests of every employee.This paper introduces negative incentive and delay in payment into the original compensation plan to observe its impact on performance.Results of the laboratory experiment demonstrate that adding negative incentive or delay in payment to general linear budget compensation contract can effectively improve performance and save labor costs.Drawing from psychology theory and from the perspective of management accounting,this paper uses the experiment research to investigate the incentive effect of different compensation contracts.This paper provides direct empirical evidence of the effect of negative incentive and delay in payment,what is morc,it gives theoretical guidance on how to use negative incentive and delay in payment in the salary plan.

关 键 词：负激励 延期支付 薪酬计划 绩效 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]