考虑生鲜电商退货的双渠道供应链协调研究  

Research on dual-channel supply chain coordination considering fresh e-tailer’s returns

作　　者：张科静[1] 马曼琼 ZHANG Kejing;MA Manqiong(Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China)

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051

出　　处：《东华大学学报（自然科学版）》2021年第6期116-123,共8页Journal of Donghua University(Natural Science)

基　　金：教育部人文社科规划项目(12YJA630185)。

摘　　要：运用Stackelberg博弈法,研究一个生鲜双渠道供应链的协调问题,其中包括一个生鲜电商和一个拥有线下商业超市的供应商。在考虑生鲜电商退货的情况下,比较集中决策模式和分散决策模式下的供应链最优决策及利润,并提出"保鲜技术+成本分担+收益共享"协调契约,最终通过算例分析验证模型和契约的有效性。结果表明:消费者对变质产品申请退款可以促使生鲜电商提高保鲜努力;与退款金额相比,批发价对协调契约的成本分担和收益共享比例的影响较为显著;消费者对新鲜度越敏感,"保鲜技术+成本分担+收益共享"契约的协调效果就越显著,生鲜供应商参与契约的意愿也越强烈。Based on Stackelberg game model, this paper focuses on the coordination of a fresh dual-channel supply chain which includes a fresh e-tailer and a supplier with chain supermarkets. Taking the return of fresh e-tailer into consideration, the optimal decisions of supply chain were compared and analyzed under centralized and decentralized model, and the "fresh-keeping technology+cost sharing+revenue sharing" contract was proposed. Besides, the validity of the model and the contract was verified through numerical analysis. The result shows that: consumers’ applying for refund of spoiled products can promote fresh e-tailer to improve the fresh-keeping effort;compared with refund amount, wholesale price has a greater impact on revenue sharing ratio as well as cost sharing ratio of the coordination contract;the more sensitive consumers are to freshness, the more significant the coordination effect of "fresh-keeping technology + cost sharing + revenue sharing" contract is, and the more willing the supplier is to participate in the contract.

关 键 词：供应链协调 保鲜技术共享 STACKELBERG博弈 双渠道 生鲜电商 退货 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]