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作 者:林乐[1] 谢德仁[2] LIN Le;XIE Deren(School of Accounting, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070,China;School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084,China)
机构地区:[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院,北京100070 [2]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084
出 处:《北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)》2022年第1期50-64,76,共16页JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES
基 金:国家自然科学基金项目“舌尖上的治理:社交媒体投资者信息能力异质性与治理效应研究”(72172098);国家自然科学基金项目“上市公司控股股东股权质押的经济后果研究:利益相关者视角”(71672098);清华大学经济管理学院研究基金项目“企业高质量发展:基于现金增加值创造力视角的研究”(2020051009)。
摘 要:关于A股上市公司经理人现金薪酬与公司对外报告的会计业绩是否挂钩,已有的主流文献给出了“是”的答案。基于2000—2019年A股上市公司CEO个体时间序列数据逐个进行回归,研究发现A股上市公司CEO现金薪酬总体上并没有与其所在公司业绩挂钩,即不存在显著正向的薪酬—业绩敏感度,这与主流文献基于传统面板数据下所得到的显著为正、幅值较小的研究结论截然不同。经测算,3317位A股公司CEO中只有33位具有显著为正的薪酬—业绩敏感度,但由于这些CEO整体现金薪酬水平偏低,实际上,随着公司业绩的变动,他们的现金薪酬变动并不大,不具有明显的经济意义。因此,A股上市公司的股东和监管机构需要反思和重构包括现金薪酬与股权激励在内的经理人薪酬激励机制,学术界也应重新评估已有相关文献的结论。Regarding whether the cash compensation of executives in A-share listed companies is linked to the company's externally reported accounting performance,the mainstream literature research has answered‘yes’.Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2000 to 2019,by running regressions one by one on the individual time series data of the CEOs in A-share listed companies,the paper documents that CEOs'cash compensation of listed companies in China,generally speaking,are not significantly linked to their performance.In other words,there is no significant and positive pay-performance sensitivity(PPS)for most CEOs,in contrast to the traditional findings arising from the cross-sectional approach which shows significantly positive but with a small amplitude one.According to our calculations,only 33 out of 3317 CEOs in A-share companies have significantly positive PPS,however,due to the overall low cash compensation level of these CEOs,in fact,as the company's performance changes,their cash compensation does not change much,which has no obvious economic significance.Therefore,shareholders and regulators of A-share listed companies need to reflect and reconstruct the manager compensation incentive mechanism including cash compensation and equity incentives,and scholars should review and rethink the existing executive incentive studies.
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