元存在论和海德格尔入世的尝试  

The Metontology and Heidegger’s Attempt of Descending to the World

作　　者：朱清华[1] ZHU Qinghua(Department of Philosophy,Capital Normal University,Beijing 100089,China)

机构地区：[1]首都师范大学哲学系,北京100089

出　　处：《同济大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第1期1-9,32,共10页Journal of Tongji University:Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“《黑皮本》与海德格尔中后期思想研究”(19BZX091)。

摘　　要：海德格尔在1928年的课程《以莱布尼兹为始点的逻辑学的形而上学基础知识》中提出要构建元存在论,以完成他重构形而上学的计划。他尝试通过元存在论来做一个翻转,即:从作为基础存在论的终点的存在理解,转向存在者整体,回到形而上学的存在者层面。在这种翻转中,海德格尔并不是求助于亚里士多德式的“神”或者德国观念论的“大全”来为他的基础存在论进一步奠基,而是意图从基础存在论的世界观念出发对具体的存在者的存在进行阐释,从而建立起伦理学、政治哲学、哲学人类学等等。这个计划最后以失败告终。但是,海德格尔放弃元存在论并不表明这个尝试是无意义的。相反,按照拉斯洛·滕格义的研究,从元存在论出发的对自然和存在者的解释较自然主义更值得选择。另外,在放弃元存在论之后,海德格尔事实上也保留了从存在理解到存在者的解释的这条向下的路。这呈现在他对诗、艺术作品以及物等的解释中。In his course Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz in 1928,Heidegger proposed metonotology in order to reconstruct metaphysics.Through metontology,he attempted to make a reversal from the interpretation of the being as the end of fundamental ontology to“the being in the whole”,and to the metaphysical being.Heidegger did not turn to Aristotle’s“god”or the“absolute totality”in German idealism for a further foundation for his fundamental ontology.Rather,he intended to explain the existence of the concrete being by the concept of the world in fundamental ontology,so as to establish ethics,political philosophy,philosophical anthropology,etc.The metontological project failed at last,but the abandonment of metontology does not mean that Heidegger’s exploration is meaningless.On the contrary,according to LászlóTengelyi,the interpretation of nature and the being based on metontology is more reasonable than that of the naturalism.Besides,after abandoning metontology,Heidegger’s attempt of descending to the world is maintained to some extent,which is reflected in his interpretation of poems,art,objects,etc.

关 键 词：基础存在论 翻转 元存在论 超越论 自然主义 

分 类 号：B516.54[哲学宗教—外国哲学]