基于社会福利的可再生能源R&D激励政策评价  

Evaluation on R&D Incentive Policies of Renewable Energy Power Generation Based on Social Welfare

作　　者：蔡强 卫贵武[1] 黄晶 夏晖 CAI Qiang;WEI Gui-wu;HUANG Jing;XIA Hui(Sichuan Normal University,Chengdu 610101,China;School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China)

机构地区：[1]四川师范大学商学院,成都610101 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都611731

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2022年第1期206-221,共16页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71473031);四川省应用基础研究重点项目(2017 JY0200);教育部人文社科研究项目(14YJA790062);四川省社会科学“十三五”规划重点项目(SC18A015)。

摘　　要：可再生能源发电新技术的R&D投资策略通常对企业价值和消费者剩余起到作用相反的不同影响,从而对基于社会福利的可再生能源电力R&D激励政策的科学制定带来挑战。针对旨在通过研发可再生能源发电新技术从而垄断清洁能源新兴市场的两非对称企业,结合投资时机选择期权博弈和社会福利模型,通过数值模拟以分析社会福利与影响其变化的补贴政策及其它诸多因素间的动态变化特征并提出相应的可再生能源电力R&D激励政策建议。结果表明:若以社会福利最大化为目标,在发电新技术R&D补贴和上网电价补贴政策的各组合应用中,企业间的R&D能力差距越大、可再生能源发电新技术的初始价值越大以及R&D成本越高,政府越应该鼓励可再生能源企业进行合作研发,反之则应鼓励竞争;随着电价补贴的提高,企业间的R&D竞争应受到鼓励;一定范围内,R&D补贴和电价补贴均能提高社会福利。论文创新性地揭示出可再生能源电力R&D投资的最优投资时机选择、电价补贴政策组合与社会福利三者间应有的内在联动关系,为政府对可再生能源电力的有效激励和管理提供富有价值的决策参考。Normally, R&D investment strategies for new technologies of renewable energy power generation have different effects on enterprise values and consumer surplus in an opposite manner resulting in a challenge on the scientific formulation of the R&D incentive policies for social welfare-based renewable energy power generation. For the asymmetric enterprises intending to monopolize the emerging markets of clean energy by the R&D of new technologies for renewable energy power generation, it is required to choose the option game and the social welfare model in combination with investment opportunities and analyze the social welfare and related subsidy policies affecting the changes of such social welfare as well as the dynamic characteristics in many other factors through numerical modeling. In addition, the corresponding recommendations for the R&D incentive policies of social welfare-based renewable energy power generation have been proposed. The results indicate that if the aim is to maximize the social welfare, in the application of each combination of the R&D subsidiesfor new generation technologies and the feed-in tariff schemes, the greater the R&D capability gap between enterprises are, the greater the initial value of new technologies for renewable energy power generation and the higher the R&D cost will be. In such case, the government should encourage renewable energy enterprises to cooperate in R&D, otherwise the competition is required to be encouraged. With the increase of the feed-in tariff, it is better to greatly encourage the competitive R&D in enterprises. Both the R&D subsidies and the feed-in tariff will improve socialwelfare within certain limits. The internal comovement relation among the optimal investment time, portfolio of power price subsidy policy and social benefits of renewable resource power R&D investment is revealed so as to provide valuable decision-making reference for the government’s effective incentive and management of renewable energy power.

关 键 词：社会福利 可再生能源电力 期权博弈 R&D激励政策 补贴 

分 类 号：X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学] F273[经济管理—企业管理]