情感认识论中的主体与对象  

On Subjectivity and Objectivity in Sentimental Epistemology

作　　者：谢文郁[1] Xie Wenyu

机构地区：[1]山东大学犹太教与跨宗教研究中心

出　　处：《哲学研究》2022年第1期84-96,126,共14页Philosophical Research

摘　　要：认识论研究一直在持守经验论中拒绝引入情感因素,即使经验论在说明人类认识活动方面无法给出圆满的解释。事实上,情感在人的实际认识活动中从未缺失。然而,如何分析情感的认识论功能的确是一个值得我们认真对待的问题。本文试图在分析中展示情感在认识活动中的主体性,以及情感所呈现的对象之实在性,追踪了烦恼、敬畏、信仰等情感在认识活动中的运作,还特别对情感命题的真值问题进行了初步演示。情感认识论涉及认识主体、认识对象和真理问题这三大认识论原则,尽管其运作方式与经验论不同,但是它们不仅在人类认识活动中有实际运作,而且在理论上也可以得到说明。Modern epistemology defined by empiricism has excluded sentimental involvement in theorizing human knowing activities,even though empiricism has demonstrated its incapability to achieve this goal. In actual human knowing activities,sentiments play active roles. However,how to analyze the functions of sentiments epistemologically is a serious issue. This article attempts to demonstrate the subjectivity of sentiments and the reality of objects presented in sentiments. Meanwhile,it strives to analyze such sentiments as anxiety,reverence,and faith,and display their epistemological functions. It also attempts to analyze sentimental propositions and show their true values. In a word,sentimental epistemology gets involved with three essential principles,that is,subjectivity,objectivity and truth value. This paper ultimately wants to prove that sentimental epistemology functions differently from empiricism,but that it does function in actual human knowing activities,and can be analyzed theoretically.

关 键 词：情感 认识主体性 认识对象 情感性命题 真值 

分 类 号：B01[哲学宗教—哲学理论]