消费者信息隐私保护对企业定价策略的影响  

The influence of privacy protection on enterprise pricing strategy

作　　者：沈月 仲伟俊[1] 梅姝娥[1] SHEN Yue;ZHONG Weijun;MEI Shu'e(School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China)

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,南京211189

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2022年第2期368-381,共14页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71871054)。

摘　　要：大数据时代,信息安全问题频发引起了消费者对信息隐私保护的需求,隐私保护成为企业在制定竞争策略时不可忽略的因素.基于消费者同时存在产品品牌偏好和不同隐私保护需求的假设,利用博弈模型分析产品的隐私保护功能对企业竞争和社会福利的影响.结果表明相较于只考虑消费者品牌偏好,同时考虑消费者品牌偏好和隐私保护需求能够增加社会福利.并且产品的隐私保护程度直接影响竞争,当消费者更关注产品品牌时,产品隐私保护程度的差距越大,产品隐私保护程度高的企业越能够制定更高的价格以获取更高的收益,而产品隐私保护程度较低的企业受到的影响则相反.但是当产品隐私保护程度的差距足够大时,产品隐私保护程度较低的企业也可以通过隐私保护获取更高的收益.当消费者更加关注隐私安全时,一定条件下,企业都可以通过隐私保护获取更高的收益.In the era of big data,the frequent occurrence of information security issues has given rise to consumers’ requirement of privacy protection.Privacy protection is essential to enterprise competition.Based on the assumption that consumers have both brand preferences and privacy protection needs,this article uses game theory to analyze the effect of the privacy protection strategies on enterprise competition and social welfare.The result shows that compared with only brand competition,competing through both brand and privacy protection can improve social welfare.The impact of privacy protection on enterprises depends on the gap in the degree of privacy protection.When consumers pay more attention on product brands,companies with high level of privacy protection can set higher prices for higher profit as the gap increases,while companies with low privacy protection are affected in contrast.When the gap is large enough,companies with low privacy protection can obtain higher profits.When consumers pay more attention on privacy security,both firms can get more profit under certain conditions.

关 键 词：隐私保护 品牌偏好 定价策略 社会福利 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]