企业集团子公司高管薪酬的参照点效应研究——来自A股上市公司的证据  

The Reference Point Effect of Executive Compensation of Subsidiaries within Conglomerate——Evidence from A-Share Listed Companies

作　　者：张秋艳[1] 邹梦婷 孟祥瑜 ZHANG Qiu-yan;ZOU Meng-ting;MENG Xiang-yu

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学人事处,湖北武汉430073 [2]武汉理工大学经济学院 [3]内蒙古财经大学金融学院,内蒙古呼和浩特010070

出　　处：《中国地质大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第3期94-109,共16页Journal of China University of Geosciences(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“银行债务契约、财务报告质量与企业投资效率”(71072103);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目“环境不确定性、成本粘性与企业盈余质量研究”(2016VI005);。

摘　　要：参照点效应即行为个体在对决策方案进行判断和评价时会以某个既存的中立基点为参照基准。研究企业集团子公司高管薪酬的参照点效应,不仅能够加深对高管薪酬参照体系的认知,还有利于揭示企业集团内部资源配置机制。以2008—2019年的系族集团A股上市子公司为样本,实证研究发现,企业集团子公司高管薪酬具有参照点效应,即如果子公司高管薪酬低于集团内其他子公司的高管薪酬,则下一年子公司高管薪酬会有所上升。机制研究发现,母子公司委托代理问题和集团内部的信息传递是子公司高管薪酬参照点效应的重要因素。拓展性分析发现,当子公司管理层能力强或经济政策不确定时,企业集团子公司高管薪酬的参照点效应越大。企业集团子公司高管薪酬的参照点效应会导致薪酬业绩脱钩。上述研究结论表明,企业集团管控能够缓解母子公司的代理问题,提高资源配置效率,在优化高管薪酬激励机制方面具有重要的现实意义。The social comparison theory holds that the economic agents not only pay attention to their own benefits,but also judge whether the distribution of benefits is fair by comparing with others.This paper explores the reference point effect of executive compensation among subsidiaries from the perspective of conglomerate.Taking A-share listed subsidiaries of the conglomerate from 2008 to 2019 as samples,this paper finds that,the formulation of the executive compensation of the subsidiaries exists reference point effect,which means that the compensation of executives is adjusted according to the compensation level of other subsidiaries within conglomerate.Through the analysis of the mechanism,the paper finds that the principal-agent problem of the parent-subsidiary and the information transfer within the conglomerate are important factors for the reference point effect of the executive compensation of the subsidiary.Further research shows that when the management of the subsidiary is strong or the economic policy is uncertain,the reference point effect of executive compensation of the subsidiary is enhanced.The reference point effect of executives compensation leads to lower pay for performance sensitivity.

关 键 词：高管薪酬契约 参照点效应 企业集团 子公司 

分 类 号：F272.923[经济管理—企业管理]