服务企业排队系统的顾客等候补偿及等候时间保证策略研究  

Research on Customer Waiting Compensation and Waiting Time Guarantee Strategy for service firms

作　　者：龚其国 易春晓 GONG Qiguo;YI Chunxiao(School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,100190)

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学经济与管理学院,北京100190

出　　处：《科技促进发展》2021年第12期2156-2164,共9页Science & Technology for Development

摘　　要：消费者会因为等待时间过长而不加入队列。为了应对这种情况,许多企业会给排队等候中的顾客提供一定的排队补偿,或承诺顾客预期等待时间,其目的是减少顾客焦虑。本文旨在研究企业的排队补偿决策和等待时间保证决策。本文以M/M/1排队模式为基础,通过构建一个考虑等候顾客补偿的排队模型得到了垄断情形下和双寡头垄断情形下企业最优的等候补偿水平的解析解,然后加入企业对顾客承诺的预期等待时间,得到了企业同时考虑等候补偿和预期等待时间保证的解析解。Consumers would get impatient and leave the queue.In order to cope with this situation,many enterprises will provide some compensation for queuing customers,or promise customers expected waiting time,in order to reduce customer anxiety.The purpose of this paper is to study the decision-making of queuing compensation and waiting time guarantee.Based on the M/M/1 queuing model,this paper constructed a queuing model considering waiting customer compensation and obtained the analytical solutions of the optimal waiting compensation level of enterprises under monopoly and duopoly monopolization.Then added the expected waiting time promised by the firms to the customer,and got the analytical solution that the firms consider both waiting compensation and expected waiting time guarantee.

关 键 词：等候补偿 等候时间保证 排队管理 排队优化决策 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]