双头董事会:治理现状和解决路径  

Two-Headed Boards:the Current State of Governance and the Path to Solutions

作　　者：曾斌 方荣杰 Zeng Bin;Fang Rongjie

机构地区：[1]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071 [2]浙江天册(深圳)律师事务所,广东深圳518057 [3]东京大学公共政策大学院,东京113-0033

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2022年第6期70-79,共10页Securities Market Herald

摘　　要：近年来,A股上市公司控制权争夺事件频发,由于制度供给不足和监管、司法乏力,导致双头董事会接连出现,使上市公司治理和投资者权益保护频频陷入困境。本文以新潮能源控制权争夺为例,揭示了双头董事会暴露的诸多问题:原管理层对外部股东行权资格的恣意限制、对外部股东提案的实质性审核,以及我国公司决议行为保全制度的不成熟和信息披露制度的不完善。为此,监管部门应及时确认股东大会决议的效力,法院对公司决议的行为保全应更审慎;同时,更高效的司法程序、更广泛的替代性争议解决机制和更完善的信息披露制度也有助于解决相关问题。In recent years,control fights in A-share listed companies have become more frequent,and due to inadequate institutional supply and lack of regulatory and judicial power,double-headed boards have kept emerging,putting listed companies’governance and investors in a frequent predicament.This paper uses the control contest of Xinchao Energy as an example to demonstrate many problems caused by the double-headed boards,including the arbitrary restriction of external shareholders’eligibility to execute their rights by current managers,the substantive review of external shareholders’proposals,as well as the immaturity of China’s corporate resolution behavior preservation system and the imperfection of the information disclosure system.To this end,the regulator should promptly confirm the validity of shareholders’meeting resolutions,and the courts should be more prudent in the behavior preservation of corporate resolutions.At the same time,more efficient judicial procedures,wider application of alternative dispute resolution and a better information disclosure system will also help to resolve the relevant issues.

关 键 词：双头董事会 控制权争夺 公司治理 证券监管 投资者保护 

分 类 号：D922.287[政治法律—经济法学]