考虑企业竞争的产品线延伸策略研究  

Research on Product Line Extension Strategy Considering Enterprise Competition

作　　者：赖雪梅 聂佳佳[1,2] LAI Xue-mei;NIE Jia-jia(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China;Service Science and Innovation Key Laboratory of Sichuan Province,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]服务科学与创新四川省重点实验室,四川成都610031

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2022年第6期147-156,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071165);西南交通大学智慧物流与供应链管理研究生导师团队项目(YJSY-DSTD201918);四川省社会科学重点研究基地系统科学与企业发展研究中心重点规划项目(Xq18B08)。

摘　　要：越来越多的企业延伸其产品线以满足消费者不同需求,本文采用博弈论探讨了企业产品线延伸策略的有效性。在竞争情形下,两个企业均有机会进行产品线延伸抢夺市场份额。通过消费者效用理论构建了两个企业的需求函数,并得到了均衡解及其利润。研究发现:Nash博弈下,当延伸成本较高时,竞争性企业会放弃产品线延伸;当延伸成本适中时,进行产品线延伸的企业将获得更多利润,而不进行产品线延伸的竞争对手将遭受损失;当延伸成本较低时,虽然企业最优的选择是延伸其产品线,但是两个企业会陷入“囚徒困境”——产品线延伸非但没有获得更多利润反而使利润减少了;另外,当两企业进行Stackelberg博弈时,本文核心结论依然成立,但两企业陷入囚徒困境的可能性增大。Designing vertically differentiated series of products and extending product line is one of the business strategies often adopted by enterprises. Game theory is used to explore the effectiveness of the vertical extension strategy of competitive enterprise product line with extension cost, in order to provide a certain scientific basis for the selection of vertical extension strategy of enterprise product line. In the competitive situation, both enterprises have the opportunity to extend their product lines and seize market share. Two demand functions of enterprises are constructed by the theory of consumer utility, and the equilibrium solution and profit are obtained. It is found that in Nash game, when the extension cost is high, the competitive enterprises will give up the extension of product line;when the extension cost is moderate, the enterprises that carry out the extension of product line will gain more profits, while the competitors who do not carry out the extension of product line will suffer losses;when the extension cost is low, although the best choice of enterprises is to extend their product line, the two enterprises will fall into“prisoner’s dilemma”. Instead of making more profit, the product line extension reduced the profit. In addition, it is found that the core conclusion of this paper is still valid when two enterprises play Stackelberg game. But when enterprise 1 is dominant, enterprise 1 is more willing to extend its product line vertically, while enterprise 2 is more reluctant to extend its product line. In addition, the comparison also shows that when two enterprises play Stackelberg game, the possibility of two enterprises falling into “prisoner’s dilemma” increases.

关 键 词：竞争性企业 产品线延伸 囚徒困境 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]