环境规制、风险补偿与高管薪酬——基于新《环境保护法》实施的经验证据  

Environmental Regulation,Risk Compensation and Executive Compensation:Empirical Evidence based on the Implementation of the New Environmental Protection Law

作　　者：唐国平[1] 孙洪锋 TANG Guo-ping;SUN Hong-feng(School of Accounting,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan,Hubei,430073,China)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《经济管理》2022年第7期140-158,共19页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“企业环保投资效率评价体系构建与应用研究”(11BJY136);财政部会计名家培养工程“中国环境资源会计理论体系构建与应用研究”(财政部财会[2016]15号)。

摘　　要：根据环境风险的变化相应地调整和设计薪酬契约以提升高管风险承担水平和增强高管环境承诺,对于提高环境规制效果及实现企业长远发展具有重要作用。本文借助2015年新《环保法》实施这一准自然实验场景,利用双重差分模型考察了环境规制对高管薪酬的影响。运用2009—2020年A股上市企业数据发现,新《环保法》实施显著提升了高管薪酬,呈现出风险补偿效应;并且随着高管风险厌恶程度的上升和经理人市场的完善,高管薪酬的风险补偿效应越明显。同时,新《环保法》实施还在一定程度上强化了薪酬黏性并弱化了薪酬业绩敏感性,这表明高管薪酬的风险补偿效应不仅在于提升薪酬的绝对水平,还在于增强失败容忍度。异质性分析发现,新《环保法》实施对高管薪酬的提升作用在民营企业、小规模企业、环境绩效较差企业以及高管职业忧虑度较高企业更为显著。进一步的经济后果检验显示,高管薪酬的风险补偿效应显著促进了企业的(绿色)技术创新活动,尤其是高质量的(绿色)技术创新。本文结论不仅丰富了环境规制和高管薪酬领域的相关文献,还为相关部门完善高管薪酬激励机制和推进绿色发展提供了重要启示。Adjusting and designing compensation contracts according to changes in environmental risks to enhance executives’risk-taking level and enhance executives’environmental commitments plays an important role in better achieving the effect of environmental regulation and the long-term development of enterprises.Empirical evidence based on western developed capital markets shows that shareholders will adjust and design executive compensation incentive arrangements according to changes in corporate environmental risks,but there is still a lack of direct research in this area in China.Therefore,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the risk compensation effect in executive compensation.With the help of the quasi-natural experimental scenario of the new Environmental Protection Law in 2015,this paper uses the double-difference model to examine the impact of environmental regulation on executive compensation.Using the data of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2020,it is found that the new“Environmental Protection Law”has significantly increased executive compensation,showing a risk compensation effect;and with the increase in executive risk aversion and the improvement of the manager market,executive compensation The more obvious the risk compensation effect.The main conclusions remain unchanged after a series of robustness tests,including parallel trend tests,placebo tests,propensity score matching(PSM),exclusion of other policy influences,and controlling for time-varying characteristics of the industry.At the same time,the new“Environmental Protection Law”also strengthens the stickiness of pay and weakens the sensitivity of pay performance to a certain extent,which shows that the risk compensation effect of executive pay is not only to increase the absolute level of pay,but also to enhance the tolerance of failure.Heterogeneity analysis found that,compared with state-owned enterprises,large-scale enterprises,enterprises with better environmental performance,and enterprises with lo

关 键 词：环境规制 风险补偿 高管薪酬 风险厌恶 技术创新 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]