VMCI下考虑顾客退货的供应链联合促销与协调  

Cooperative Promotion and Coordination in Supply Chain under Consumer Return and VMCI Environments

作　　者：武志辉 陈东彦 WU Zhi-hui;CHEN Dong-yan(School of Automation,Harbin University of Science and Technology,Harbin 150080,China;School of Science,Harbin University of Science and Technology,Harbin 150080,China)

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨理工大学自动化学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150080 [2]哈尔滨理工大学理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150080

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2022年第8期39-44,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：黑龙江省自然科学基金优秀青年项目(YQ2020A004);黑龙江省普通高校基本科研业务费专项基金(LGYC2018JC007);国家自然科学基金项目(72001059,12071102)。

摘　　要：在允许顾客退货的环境下,以供应商管理寄售库存(VMCI)的供应链为对象,探讨了供应链的促销决策及协调问题。研究发现,集中情景下最优的寄售库存量与促销水平均高于分散情景下的对应值;根据在供应链运营过程中双方成员承担的不同风险设计的滞销补贴-双向促销成本分担契约可以实现供应链协调;期望退货费用不超过某一阈值时,全额退货策略优于不允许退货策略。此外,通过数值仿真揭示了顾客评估风险对利润及协调契约的影响。Under the consumer return environment,the problems of the cooperative promotion and coordination in a two-echelon supply chain are considered,where the supply chain operates in the vendor-managed consignment inventory(VMCI).The study finds that the optimal consignment inventory and the optimal promotional effort levels under centralized decisions are higher than those in the decentralized decisions.The coordination of supply chain can be realized by the markdown allowance-bilateral promotional cost sharing contract,which is designed according to different risks undertaken by two members in the supply chain operation.The full-refund policy is superior to the no return policy when the expected returning cost doesn’t exceed a certain threshold.Finally,a numerical simulation is provided to explore the impacts of the risk of consumer’s valuation on the channel profit and the coordination contract.

关 键 词：顾客退货 促销努力 供应商管理寄售库存 寄售契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]