必然同一理论视角下的分析与综合  

Analyticity and Syntheticity: Necessary Theory of Identity Perspective

作　　者：郝喜娇 刘叶涛 HAO Xijiao;LIU Yetao(College of Philosophy Nankai University,Tianjin 300350 China)

机构地区：[1]南开大学哲学院,天津300350

出　　处：《燕山大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2022年第5期10-16,共7页Journal of Yanshan University:Philosophy and Social Science

基　　金：天津市研究生科研创新项目“克里普克因果指称理论的认识论研究”(2020YJSS191)。

摘　　要：克里普克基于认识论、形而上学和语言哲学三个领域的划分提出必然同一理论,给出了一个陈述表征何种事态的合理途径,但克里普克并未始终贯彻三个领域的划分,依据必然同一理论重新界定分析陈述和综合陈述表征何种事态,反而径直接受了分析命题表征必然事态的传统观点。依照克里普克本意重新界定分析陈述与综合陈述表征何种事态,可以得出,并不是所有的分析命题都表征个体自我同一的逻辑必然事态,也并不是所有的综合命题都表征偶然事态,克里普克径直接受分析命题表征必然事态的传统观点是本可以避免的。Based on the division of epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of language, Kripke proposed Necessary Theory of Identity, and gave a reasonable way for statements to narrate which state of affairs represent. However, Kripke did not implement the division of the three fields, and redefined what state of affairs were represented by analytic statements and synthetic statements according to Necessary Theory of Identity. Instead, he simply accepted the traditional view that analytic propositions represent the necessary states of affairs. Based on the theory of necessary identity, we redefine what kind of state of affairs is represented by analytic statement and synthetic statement, and conclude that not all analytic propositions represent logical necessary state of affairs of individual self-identity. At the same time, not all synthetic propositions represent contingent state of affairs, and it is unreasonable for Kripke to simply accept the traditional view that analytic propositions represent necessary states of affairs.

关 键 词：分析命题 综合命题 实体-实体关联 逻辑必然事态 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]