“利益范式”与休谟正义动机论的转折  

“Interest Paradigm” and the Transition of Hume’s Justice Motivation Theory

作　　者：栾俊 Luan Jun(School of Marxism,Jiangnan University,Wuxi,China)

机构地区：[1]江南大学马克思主义学院,江苏无锡214122

出　　处：《社会科学论坛》2022年第6期50-61,共12页Tribune of Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目《休谟人性视域下的理性观研究》阶段性成果,项目编号:21FZXB053。

摘　　要：“利益范式”是在经济学强势影响下被现代社会科学广泛接受的研究范式,休谟常被视为支持这一范式的较早的杰出代表。但考察休谟正义动机论的转折可以发现,利益范式并非没有缺陷,休谟对之也非一味认同。面对“狡猾投机者”的挑战,休谟认为仅靠利益(自利)推演正义动机的体系是不完备的,遂提出“仁爱”加以应对。仁爱的引入虽然使休谟再次回到了“利益范式”,但这不是退回对人性“经济自利”的通常理解,而是迈向了一种基于仁爱的高级自利观。若缺失对人性自利的这种更高理解,现代人长久的共同道德生活是难以设想的。这对今人习惯于把社会失范归为制度问题而不首先检讨流俗人性观念的做法,无疑有着重要的纠偏意义。“Interest paradigm” is a research paradigm widely accepted by modern social sciences under the strong influence of economics.Hume is often regarded as an early representative supporting this paradigm.However,by examining Hume’s justice motivation theory from Treatise to Enquiry,we find that “interest paradigm” is not without defects,and Hume does not blindly agree with it.Facing the challenge of “sensible knave”,Hume holds that the system of interpreting justice motivation only by self-interest is incomplete,so he puts forward benevolence to deal with it.The introduction of benevolence finally made Hume return to “interest paradigm” again,but this is not back to the “economic self-interest” notion of human nature,but move towards to a high-level view of self-interest based on benevolence.Without the higher understanding of human nature,it is difficult to imagine the common moral life of modern people.This indicates that we should rethink the mercenary conception of human nature,but not attribute social anomie only to institutional problems.

关 键 词：休谟 利益范式 正义动机论 自利 仁爱 

分 类 号：B504[哲学宗教—外国哲学]