作为斯多葛主义批评者的亚当·斯密  

Adam Smith:As A Critic of Stoicism

作　　者：张江伟[1] ZHANG Jiang-wei(Zhejiang International Studies University,Hangzhou,Zhejiang310023)

机构地区：[1]浙江外国语学院马克思主义学院,浙江杭州310023

出　　处：《汕头大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2022年第2期11-20,94,共11页Journal of Shantou University(Humanities and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金一般项目“苏格兰启蒙运动政治经济思想研究”(22YJA770021)。

摘　　要：在对斯多葛自杀论的反驳中,斯密践行了自己的道德哲学方法论。他否定前者关于激情和理性的看法,重新肯定了激情以及激情的交流对于人类生活各方面的意义。而通过将斯多葛神学目的论的视角拉回到人间,从人际互动和社会化的激情中寻找人类道德生活的尺度,斯密否定了斯多葛的理性化的合宜性概念,调整了激情与道德的关系,从道德实在论的观点转向了道德俗成主义。他也否定了斯多葛非人化的道德理想主义和道德严格主义,为真正属于人的、考虑人之激情与限制的道德哲学和生活世界奠定了基础。总的而言,斯密不认为斯多葛主义在知识论和道德动力层面可以充分地支撑人对自己的关心以及对其他人的义务。斯密试图在激情以及激情的沟通和互动中奠定一个充满适度友爱的生活秩序。但是在其晚年他意识到由于情感腐败,这一设想是过度乐观的。On the basis of using various historical and empirical evidence against Stoic suicide theory and other ideas,Smith denied the former's views on passion and reason,and reaffirmed the significance of passion and the exchanges of passion for all aspects of human life.He even affirmed the rationality of selfish passion,thus laying a foundation for his political economy.By drawing the perspective of Stoic theological teleology down to the world,and looking for the measure of human moral life from interpersonal interaction and socialized passions,Smith negated Stoic’s rational concept of propriety and adjusted the relationship between passions and morality,and shifted from moral realism to moral conventionalism.He also denied Stoic’s dehumanized moral idealism and moral rigorism,therefore laid the foundation for the true moral philosophy that belongs to man.In general,Smith does not think that Stoicism can fully underpin people’s concern for themselves and their obligations to others in term of knowledge theory and moral motivation.But at his later age,he realizes his project is over-optimistical.

关 键 词：激情 理性 合宜性 斯多葛主义 道德 

分 类 号：B504[哲学宗教—外国哲学]