厚此薄彼还是一视同仁?——高管结构性权力配置与家族企业长期投资  

Favoritism or Equality? Structural Power Configuration of Executives and Long-term Investment in Family Businesses

作　　者：严若森[1] 赵亚莉 Yan Ruosen;Zhao Yali(Economics and Management School,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《外国经济与管理》2022年第10期54-69,共16页Foreign Economics & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(72072137);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(18YJA630126)。

摘　　要：如何配置家族高管与非家族高管的结构性权力以保证经营决策的科学性,对于家族企业的长期发展来说至关重要。本文以2012—2019年中国沪深两市A股上市家族企业为研究样本,考察高管结构性权力配置对家族企业长期投资的影响。研究发现:(1)“厚此薄彼”的高管结构性权力配置并不能显著促进家族企业的长期投资,具体表现为“厚”家族高管“薄”非家族高管的高管结构性权力配置对家族企业长期投资的影响并不显著,“厚”非家族高管“薄”家族高管的高管结构性权力配置则会显著抑制家族企业长期投资;(2)对家族高管与非家族高管“一视同仁”的高管结构性权力配置会显著促进家族企业的长期投资。进一步的研究表明,高管结构性权力的均衡配置对家族企业长期投资的促进效应主要是通过促进高管长期目标导向、提升高管团队异质性水平而实现的。而且,当家族企业处于成长期、成熟期或者其所面临的市场竞争程度较高时,高管结构性权力的均衡配置对家族企业长期投资的促进作用更强。本文为优化家族企业内部治理、改善家族企业的长期投资水平、促进家族企业“基业长青”等提供了经验证据和管理启示。The family business has become an active economic growth point in China’s national economy,but the problems of governance and investment are the key factors restricting the development of family businesses.As the makers and executors of decision-making,executives have an impact on long-term investment such as R&D expenditure and capital expenditure,which are related to the survival and development of family businesses.In addition,considering that the structural power of executives directly affects the efficiency of resource allocation and the actual distribution of interests,then,along with the non-family executives gradually participate in the management of family businesses,how to allocate the structural power of family executives and non-family executives to ensure the scientific decision-making and realize the long-term development of family businesses becomes very important.In general,family businesses may adopt the differentiated executive structural power configuration mode of“favoritism”or the balanced executive structural power configuration mode of“equality”.However,for the long-term investment in pursuit of the long-term survival and development of businesses,it is worth discussing whether family executives and non-family executives should be treated as“favoritism”or“equality”.In this connection,taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2012 to 2019 as samples,this paper empirically studies the impact of executive structural power configuration on the long-term investment of family businesses.The results show that:(1)The executive structural power configuration mode of“favoritism”cannot significantly promote the long-term investment of family businesse.Specifically,the“thick”structural power configuration of family executives and the“thin”structural power configuration of non-family executives have no significant impact on the long-term investment of family businesses,and the“thick”structural power configuration of non-family executi

关 键 词：家族企业 高管结构性权力配置 企业长期投资 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]