共同机构所有权与企业信息披露质量  

Common Institutional Ownership and the Quality of Corporate Information Disclosure

作　　者：王思瑞 叶勇 WANG Sirui;YE Yong(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2023年第1期108-118,共11页East China Economic Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目“公共信息成本与信息渠道选择行为研究”(21YJA630107)。

摘　　要：文章以2010—2020年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,深入考察了共同机构所有权对企业信息披露质量的影响效应及其机制。研究表明:共同机构所有权能够显著提高企业的信息披露质量;进一步研究发现:在市场化程度越低、内部治理水平越差、产权性质为国有企业以及共同机构投资者持股时间较长的企业样本中,共同机构所有权对企业信息披露质量的正向影响更为明显;机制检验表明,信息不对称程度和高管薪酬业绩敏感性在共同机构所有权与企业信息披露质量之间发挥了部分中介作用。研究对于如何提升企业信息披露质量、保障投资者利益具有一定的理论贡献和现实意义。This paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2020 as the research object,and deeply investigates the effect and mechanism of common institutional ownership on the quality of corporate information disclosure.The research shows that common institutional ownership can significantly improve the quality of corporate information disclosure;further research finds that in the sample of enterprises with lower degree of marketization,lower level of internal governance,state-owned enterprises with property right,and long shareholding period of common institutional investors,the positive impact of common institutional ownership on the quality of corporate information disclosure is more obvious;the mechanism test shows that the degree of information asymmetry and the sensitivity of executive compensation performance play a partial mediating role between common institutional ownership and corporate information disclosure.The research has certain theoretical contribution and practical significance on how to improve the quality of corporate information disclosure and protect the interests of investors.

关 键 词：共同机构所有权 信息披露质量 信息不对称 薪酬业绩敏感性 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]