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作 者:孙再凌 蔡宇莹 赵雨亭 SUN Zai-ling;CAI Yu-ying;ZHAO Yu-ting(College of Accouting,Inner Mongolia University of Finance and Economics,Hohhot,China,010070)
机构地区:[1]内蒙古财经大学会计学院,内蒙古呼和浩特010070
出 处:《财经理论研究》2022年第6期76-93,共18页Journal of Finance and Economics Theory
基 金:内蒙古哲学社会科学规划项目(SB20160010)。
摘 要:中国企业缺乏正式制度背景下,依托差序格局形成的董事会非正式层级成为影响董事会治理效率的重要因素,但非正式层级治理效果存在争议。本文依托预期地位理论和关系契约理论,以费用粘性为切入点,采用2008-2019年面板数据,实证检验沪、深两市上市公司董事会非正式层级对企业资源配置决策的影响。研究结果发现:董事会非正式层级清晰度提高,企业费用粘性水平下降,非正式层级呈现积极治理作用。且在经济政策变动性高、股权集中度高的情形下,治理效果更为突出。因此,企业挑选董事成员时,不应追求全明星阵容,而应塑造适度的非正式层级,这有助于董事会提高决策效率,发挥更好的治理效用。Under the background of the lack of the formal system in Chinese enterprises,the informal hierarchy of the board formed by the differential order pattern has become an important factor affecting the efficiency of board governance.The effect of informal hierarchy governance,however,is controversial.Based on the expected status theory and the relational contract theory,this paper took the cost stickiness as the starting point,and adopted the panel data from 2008 to 2019 to empirically test the influence of informal hierarchy of the board of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets on enterprise resource allocation decisions.The results show that the definition of the informal hierarchy of the board is improved,the level of corporate cost stickiness is reduced,and the informal hierarchy plays a positive role in governance.Besides,in the case of high volatility of economic policies and high concentration of equity,the governance effect is more prominent.Therefore,when selecting board members,formal hierarchy is not the only option.Instead,they should create a moderate informal hierarchy,which will help the board improve decision-making efficiency and exert better governance effectiveness.
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