高管团队内部约束的治理效应--基于CEO vs非CEO高管薪酬差距视角  

Governance Effects of Internal Constraints on Executive Teams--Evidence from the Perspective of Pay Gap between CEO and Non-CEO Executives

作　　者：张蕊[1,2] 刘佳旋 王洋洋[2] ZHANG Rui;LIU Jia-xuan;WANG Yang-yang

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计发展研究中心 [2]江西财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《财务研究》2022年第6期36-52,共17页Finance Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71862015);江西省研究生创新专项资金项目(YC2022-B126)。

摘　　要：本文以2007~2020年我国A股上市公司为样本,以非CEO高管相对于CEO的独立性衡量高管团队内部约束,探讨其对高管薪酬差距的治理效应。研究发现:高管团队内部约束可以显著降低高管薪酬差距,而且,在CEO权力较小以及非CEO高管监督动机和能力较强时,这一约束效果更加显著。异质性分析表明,高管团队内部约束对高管薪酬差距的治理效应在股权集中度高的企业和机构投资者持股比例大的企业表现更明显。作用机制检验表明,高管团队内部约束通过改善企业信息环境和缓解代理问题,从而缩小高管薪酬差距。进一步研究发现,高管团队内部约束抑制了CEO薪酬粘性,降低了CEO薪酬,从而推进CEO薪酬与企业业绩相匹配。本文的研究有助于深入理解企业高管薪酬差距的形成机制,对于优化上市公司管理层结构具有一定的现实启示。This paper explores the governance effect of internal constraints on executive pay gap by measuring the independence of non-CEO executives relative to CEOs for a sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2020.It is found that internal constraints within the executive team can significantly reduce the executive pay gap.and this constraint effect is more significant when the CEO has less power and the non-CEO executives have greater motivation and ability to monitor.Heterogeneity research shows that the governance effect of internal constraints on executive pay gap is more pronounced in firms with high equity concentration and large shareholding of institutional investors.The mechanism by which internal discipline within the executive team exerts its governance effect is by improving the corporate information environment and alleviating agency problems.Further research shows that internal constraints within the executive team could curb CEO pay stickiness and reduce CEO pay,thus ensure that CEO pay matches corporate performance.The research in this paper contributes to an in-depth understanding of the formation mechanism of the corporate executive pay gap.and provides some practical inspiration for optimizing the management structure of listed companies.

关 键 词：高管团队 高管权力 内部约束 薪酬差距 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]