环境不确定性、高管任期与投资效率关系研究——基于中国制造业上市公司的经验证据  

A Study on the Relationship between Environmental Uncertainty,Executive Tenure and Investment Efficiency:Based on Empirical Evidence of Listed Companies in China s Manufacturing Industry

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作  者:闫浩宇 杨洪涛 YAN Haoyu;YANG Hongtao(School of Accounting,Southwest Forestry University,Kunming 650224,China)

机构地区:[1]西南林业大学会计学院,昆明650224

出  处:《科技与经济》2022年第6期81-85,共5页Science & Technology and Economy

基  金:云南省教育厅科学研究基金项目——“环境不确定性、内部控制与绩效的关系研究——基于制造业上市公司”(项目编号:2022Y643,项目负责人:闫浩宇)成果之一。

摘  要:基于996家A股制造业上市公司2016—2020年财务数据,在探究环境不确定性对投资效率影响的基础上,结合高阶理论、管家理论分析高管任期对二者关系的调节作用,并引入股权性质和两职权力结构进一步研究,以期为我国制造业企业提升投资效率、抵御环境不确定性、保持高管任职连续性提供更有针对性的思路。研究发现:环境不确定性会降低投资效率;高管任期的延长在非国有企业中会加剧环境不确定性引起的投资不足,在国有企业中则会缓解环境不确定性引起的投资过度;在“两职分离”企业中会加剧环境不确定性引起的投资不足,在“两职合一”企业中则会缓解环境不确定性引起的投资不足。Based on the financial data of 996 A-share listed manufacturing companies from 2016 to 2020,this paper discusses the moderating effect of executive tenure on the relationship between environmental uncertainty and investment efficiency by high-order theory and principal-agent theory,then introduces equity properties and power structure of two positions for further study so as to providing a targeted ideas for the manufacturing enterprises in China to improve investment efficiency,resist the environmental uncertainty and maintain the continuity of executive tenure.The results are as follows:environmental uncertainty will reduce investment efficiency;the extension of executive tenure can aggravate the under-investment caused by it in non-state-owned enterprises and weaken the over-investment caused by it in state-owned enterprises.Under-investment due to environmental uncertainty will be exacerbated in“separation”companies,but this phenomenon is reduced in“two-roles-in-one”companies.

关 键 词:环境不确定性 投资效率 高管任期 股权性质 两职合一 

分 类 号:F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F425[经济管理—国民经济] F406.7

 

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