霍布斯、布拉姆霍尔与自由意志问题  

Hobbes,Bramhall and The Free Will Problem

作　　者： 毛兴贵(译)[2,3] 高雪(译) Paul Russell(University of British Columbia in Canada,Mao Xinggui,Gao Xue,Southwest University,400715)

机构地区：[1]加拿大英属哥伦比亚大学哲学系 [2]西南大学哲学系 [3]西南大学西方马克思主义研究所

出　　处：《哲学评论》2022年第1期92-117,共26页Wuda Philosophical Review

基　　金：国家社科基金项目“霍布斯政治哲学著作翻译与研究”(18BZX090)。

摘　　要：本文审视了霍布斯自然主义道德科学中的自由意志问题。这一时期,随着机械论哲学延伸到人类心理学,道德责任和法律责任的问题变得紧迫起来,结果导致人类的选择是用欲望和偏好来解释的,而不是被描绘成出于自主能力的行为。霍布斯通过其《利维坦》仍塑造着当代的争论,且在当代争论中依然能找到共鸣,在这种意义上,他改变了道德哲学的面貌。This article examines the free will problem as it arises within Thomas Hobbes’naturalistic science of morals in early modern Europe.It explains that during this period,the problem of moral and legal responsibility become acute as mechanical philosophy was extended to human psychology and as a result human choices were explained in terms of desires and preferences rather than being represented as acts of an autonomous faculty.It describes how Hobbes changed the face of moral philosophy,through his Leviathan,in ways that still structure and resonate within the contemporary debate.

关 键 词：霍布斯 布拉姆霍尔 自由意志 同意 道德法则 

分 类 号：B561.22[哲学宗教—外国哲学]