企业绩效反馈对大股东隧道行为影响机理探究——企业所有制性质和市场化程度的调节作用  

Tunneling Behavior of Major Shareholders Ownership Structure and Marketization Degree as Moderating Effect

作　　者：沈灏[1] 辛姜 SHEN Hao;XIN Jiang

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2023年第2期101-113,共13页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“互联网商业环境下的开放式创新与跨界融合对新兴技术及商业模式创新的影响研究”(项目编号:71672138)。

摘　　要：绩效反馈能够影响大股东隧道行为且受制于企业内部股权结构和外部市场环境的调节作用,但现有文献中缺乏探讨有关绩效反馈对大股东隧道行为影响机理方面的学术成果。笔者依据2011—2020年中国沪深A股市场中剔除了金融类等特殊类型企业后的上市公司数据,利用多元线性回归方法,实证检验绩效反馈对大股东隧道行为的影响及其过程中企业所有制性质和企业所在地区市场化程度的调节作用。结果证实:绩效反馈与大股东隧道行为之间存在显著的正U型关系;企业所有制性质和企业所在地区市场化程度对绩效反馈与大股东隧道行为之间的正U型关系具有调节作用,国有企业属性和企业所在地区市场化程度的提高会削弱两者之间的关系。本研究基于实证检验的研究结论,在一定程度上拓展了企业行为理论和代理理论的边际,丰富了绩效反馈和隧道行为方面的相关文献,为监管机构防治大股东隧道行为的具体实践提供了理论依据。Performance feedback affects major shareholders’ tunneling behavior, which is subjected to ownership and marketization.However, the existing literature lacks a discussion on the mechanism of the impact of performance feedback on major shareholders’ tunneling behavior.Based on the data of enterprises excluding financial and other special types of enterprises in the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market from 2011 to 2020, we use multiple linear regression analysis to test the effect of performance feedback on tunneling behavior and the moderating effect of ownership and marketization.The results show that performance feedback has a U-shaped effect on major shareholders’ tunneling behavior.Furthermore, we find that the ownership of state-owned and the marketization degree of region where the enterprises is located weaken the U-shaped effect.Based on the research conclusions of empirical test, this paper expands the behavioral theory of the firm and agency theory, enriches the relevant literature on performance feedback and tunneling behavior, and provides the theoretical basis for supervision organizations to prevent major shareholders’ tunneling behavior.

关 键 词：绩效反馈 隧道行为 企业所有制 市场化程度 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]