家族企业两权分离与跨国并购——基于“掏空”行为视角的机制解释  

Impact of Separation Between Control and Ownership on International Acquisition in Family Firms:From the Perspective of "Tunneling"

作　　者：孙轻宇[1] 王云开 张峰 杜国臣[4] Sun Qingyu;Wang Yunkai;Zhang Feng;Du Guochen(Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China;King's College London,London WC2R2LS,UK;Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China;Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation,Beijing 100710,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学旅游与酒店管理学院,116025 [2]伦敦国王学院商学院,WC2R2LS [3]南开大学跨国公司研究中心,全球营销研究中心,300071 [4]商务部国际贸易经济合作研究院,100710

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2022年第11期172-188,共17页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金：南开大学文科发展基金“制造企业高质量发展路径选择研究”(ZB22BZ0208);南开大学跨国公司研究中心课题“贸易自由化、数字化转型与垂直整合”(ctsnk202102)的资助;辽宁省教育厅科学研究经费项目“外资企业在华竞合战略研究:动态演进机制与综合绩效评价”(LN2020Q20)。

摘　　要：控股家族将企业资产和利润转移,致使企业自身被“掏空”,使得家族企业控股股东与中小股东发生利益冲突。以此为切入点,本文利用2003—2019年我国上市家族企业为研究样本,探讨了在两权分离条件下实施的跨国并购是否具有更强的“掏空”性质,以更深入理解近年家族企业日益活跃的跨国并购活动以及引发的一系列违规行为。研究结果显示,控制权与现金流权分离程度越高,家族企业跨国并购的可能性越大。进一步,本文利用双重和三重差分模型证实,在两权分离条件下,家族企业实施跨国并购后,控股股东的非经营性资金占用现象更加严重,即两权分离加剧了跨国并购的“掏空”行为。本文结论有助于从内部治理结构的视角识别家族企业实施跨国并购的“背后”动机,为政府有效监管家族企业海外投资并实现“高质量”走出去战略提供政策启示。"Tunneling",which refers to the transfer of assets and profits out of a company to its controlling shareholder family,has enhanced the type Ⅱ agency problem in family firms. Where,the conflicts between controlling shareholder families and minority shareholders(type Ⅱ agency problem)have always been a hot issue in the field of family business governance. Therefore,this paper examines the sample of Chinese-listed family firms from 2003 to 2019 to explore whether international acquisitions may cause more "tunneling" activities under the separation between control and ownership,hence,to have a deeper understanding of the increasingly overseas mergers and acquisitions activities of family firms and a series of violations caused by them in recent years. Our study finds that the separation between control and ownership leads to the increase of possibilities of international acquisitions in family firms. Furthermore,by using the DDD model,this paper demonstrates that,under the condition of separation between control and ownership,the phenomenon of non-operational capital occupation of controlling shareholders becomes more intensified after family firms carry out overseas mergers and acquisitions. Our findings are helpful to identify the motivation of family firms’ international acquisitions from the perspective of internal governance structure,which also brings a new sight into the policy enlightenment for the government on the effective supervision of overseas investments by family firms and the achievement of "high quality" global strategy.

关 键 词：家族企业 两权分离 跨国并购 “掏空”行为 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51