碳交易政策下双目的主导企业的碳减排策略  

Carbon Emissions Reduction Strategy of Dual Purpose Leading Enterprise under Cap and Trade

作　　者：刘璐 王凯 LIU Lu;WANG Kai(School of Management,Nanjing University of Posts&Telecommunications,Nanjing 210003;School of Management,Jilin University,Changchun 130025;Tongda College of Nanjing University of Posts&Telecommunications,Yangzhou 225127,China)

机构地区：[1]南京邮电大学管理学院,江苏南京210003 [2]吉林大学管理学院,吉林长春130025 [3]南京邮电大学通达学院,江苏扬州225127

出　　处：《物流技术》2023年第1期39-44,64,共7页Logistics Technology

基　　金：江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究项目(2021SJZDA036);2021年江苏省研究生科研创新计划(KYCX21_0854)。

摘　　要：针对一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链,分析碳交易政策下一个具有双目的主导企业的碳减排策略,关注消费者剩余,构建了集中决策、主导者不同的分散决策以及主导者利润共享下的模型。研究发现,无论主导者为制造商还是零售商,集中决策并不总是优于分散决策;当制造商减排成本系数在一定范围内时,主导者进行利润共享会实现共赢目标;主导地位会影响企业利润、产品需求和制造商减排水平。当主导者拥有优先的话语权时,可以提升企业利润,使主导者利益与消费者剩余最大化。In this paper, looking at a two-echelon supply chain composing of a manufacturer and a retailer, we analyzed the carbon emissions reduction strategy of a dual-objective leading enterprise under the cap and trade policy. Focusing on consumer surplus, we constructed three relevant models respectively under centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making under different leaderships, and sharing of the profit of the leading enterprise. The study found that centralized decision-making did not always yield better result than decentralized decision-making, regardless of the leading player being the manufacturer or the retailer;when the manufacturer’s emissions reduction cost coefficient fell within a certain range, the profit sharing by the leading player would achieve win-win in the supply chain;the leadership status would affect the profit and, product demand of the enterprises and the emissions reduction level of the manufacturer;and privilege of the leading enterprise could increase the profit of the enterprises and maximize the interests of the leading enterprise and the consumer surplus.

关 键 词：碳交易 双目的 主导企业 碳减排 

分 类 号：X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学] F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]