关于心灵、机器与真理的模态论证  

The Modal Argument on Mind,Machine and Truth

作　　者：薄谋[1] Mou Bo(School of Philosophy and Sociology,Lanzhou University)

机构地区：[1]兰州大学哲学社会学院

出　　处：《逻辑学研究》2023年第1期80-92,共13页Studies in Logic

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“算术与集合的实在论解释”(22BZX128)。

摘　　要：卢卡斯和彭罗斯认为,人们从哥德尔不完全性定理出发可以推断“心灵不能被机械化”的论题。这是一个强论断。弱论断是由哥德尔提出的。他认为从自己的不完全性定理出发,人们只能推断或者“心灵不能被机械化”成立或者“存在不可判定的数学命题”成立。该析取式论断等价于“如果理想化人类心灵是理想化有限机器,那么人们无法判定某些数学命题的真或假”。哥德尔建议人们从解决内涵悖论入手,证明反机械主义论题成立。科尔纳在机械主义论题上取得的成功,激发斯特恩尝试从可替代真理论出发,证明反机械主义论题成立。科尔纳表明斯特恩的论证无效。斯特恩尝试改进他的论证。我们也表明斯特恩的改进方案无效。斯特恩两次尝试均无法取得成功,这实际上源于人们无法认清楚理想化人类心灵概念即绝对可证明性概念。Lukas and Penrose both think that from the G?del’s incompleteness theorems people can deduce the thesis of“the mind cannot be mechanized”.This is a strong assertion.The weak assertion was proposed by G?del.He thinks that from his theorems people can only conclude either“the mind cannot be mechanized”or“there exists an undecidable mathematical proposition”.This disjunctive assertion is equivalent to“if the idealized human mind is the idealized finite machine,then people cannot decide whether this mathematical proposition is true or false”.G?del suggests people should justify the anti-mechanism thesis beginning from the intentional paradox.Motivated by Koellner’s success in mechanistic thesis,Stern try to prove the anti-mechanistic thesis from alternative theories of truth.Koellner then shows Stern’s argument does not hold.After that Stern tries to improve on his previous work.We show Stern’s revised argument also does not hold.Stern’s two failed arguments stem from the fact that people have no method to recognize the notion of idealized human mind is exactly the notion of absolute provability.

关 键 词：绝对可证明性 免类型真理论 数学真理 数学认知 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]