基于两阶段多任务道德风险模型的失业参保职工激励机制研究  

Incentive Mechanism of Unemployed Insured Worker Based on Two-stage Multitasking Moral Hazard Model

作　　者：李铁宁[1] 李曦 李玉琳 张琚亮 LI Tiening;LI Xi;LI Yulin;ZHANG Juliang(School of Economics and Management,Changsha University of Science and Technology,Changsha 410076,China;Computer and Communication Engineering Institute,Changsha University of Science and Technology,Changsha 410114,China)

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,湖南长沙410076 [2]长沙理工大学计算机与通信工程学院,湖南长沙410114

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2023年第2期226-232,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：湖南省2018年自然科学基金资助课题(2018JJ2448);长沙理工大学2021年科研创新项目(CX2021SS7)。

摘　　要：现有文献大多侧重于劳动经济学视角,针对失业保险道德风险的间接影响因素进行研究。并未针对现实的失业保险道德风险问题深入研究。论文基于委托代理理论,以失业参保职工为研究对象,结合国家失业保险的最新政策,针对企业参保职工失业过程中,在资格审查和待遇发放两个阶段,自愿失业、延缓就业和隐性就业三种最可能发生的道德风险行为,构建了失业参保职工两阶段多任务激励模型,并借助Matlab2017b数值仿真展示了主要影响因素与最优激励因子之间的关系。研究得出了若干防范失业参保职工失业道德风险的有益结论和建议。At present,the Chinese government attaches great importance to unemployment insurance and re-employment.The State Council,the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of China issued special documents successively in 2017 and 2019 on returning and subsidizing unemployed workers’skills upgrading.However,unlike endowment insurance and medical insurance,unemployment insurance can only be entrusted by the state and provided by unemployment insurance institutions,so the moral hazard problem is serious.If this kind of problem cannot be curbed in time,it will lead to a large amount of unemployment insurance fund consumption,and reduce the unemployment insurance fund for the re-employment engineering guarantee function.Therefore,the research in this paper is of important theoretical value and practical reference value for using economic means to prevent the moral hazard of unemployed insured workers.Most domestic and foreign literature focuses on the perspective of labor economics and studies the indirect influencing factors of the moral hazard of unemployment insurance.However,realistic unemployment insurance’s specific form of moral hazard has not been studied deeply.This paper takes enterprise unemployed insured worker as the research object,combining with the latest relevant incentives of state unemployment insurance,and constructs the compound two-stage multitasking incentive model for unemployed insured workers by basing principal-agent theory which aims at the three typical moral hazards of voluntary unemployment,delayed employment and hidden employment that may occur during the unemployment period of insured workers at the two stages of the qualification review and treatment provided,and uses Matlab2017b simulation to show the relationship between the main influencing factors and optimal incentive factors.In this paper,the key ideas of complex two-stage multi-task incentive model are as follows:On the one hand,Jarque’s(2010)expression of income function S t=∑tτ=1ηt-τeτis used for reference.Amon

关 键 词：失业职工 委托代理理论 两阶段多任务道德风险 激励机制 

分 类 号：F842.6[经济管理—保险]