消费者公平关切下的广告投资和渠道选择  

The Advertising Investment and Channel Selection with Fairness Customers

作　　者：李庆颖 丁紫雯 朱晨 LI Qingying;DING Ziwen;ZHU Chen(Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China)

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2023年第1期17-25,共9页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71871052,71832001);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(2232018H-07);东华大学励志计划资助;东华大学研究生创新基金资助(CUSF-DH-D-2021064)。

摘　　要：考虑了具有消费者公平关切与广告敏感异质性的广告投资问题。分别讨论了直销和经销两种渠道模式,在每种渠道模型下研究了最优销售价格和广告投资水平,并进行了两种渠道模式下最优结果的对比。研究结果表明:与经销渠道相比,消费者在直销渠道中获得更低的价格;与直销渠道相比,经销渠道下的最优广告投资水平更高;市场中高敏感型消费者的比例会影响制造商的渠道选择,制造商可以通过对市场中的消费者偏好研究来进行渠道选择;当高敏感型消费者的比例较高时,经销渠道给制造商带来更高利润但零售商没有动机加入,制造商通过引入讨价还价合约,最终可以使得供应链双方达到双赢。An advertising investment problem was investigated,where customers were fair minded and heterogeneous in the advertising sensitivity. Two channel modes,including direct selling and agent selling,were investigated. Under each selling model,the optimal selling price and the advertising level were determined and compared. The following results are obtained. Customers always face a lower price under direct selling. The optimal advertising investment is higher under agent selling. The proportion of high-sensitive consumers in the market will affect the channel selection of manufacturer. If the proportion of high-sensitive customers is sufficiently high,then the manufacturer prefers agent selling,but the retailer has no incentive to join. In this case,a bargaining contract is introduced to incentive the retailer to join and benefit both the manufacturer and the retailer.

关 键 词：消费者公平关切 经销渠道 直销渠道 广告投资 讨价还价合约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]