信息不对称下的经理人薪酬议价研究——基于双边随机前沿模型(BSFM)  

On Manager Compensation Bargaining Under Information Asymmetry:A Study Based on Bilateral Stochastic Frontier Model(BSFM)

作　　者：王乐乐 章思敏 WANG Lele;ZHANG Simin(School of Business,Anhui University,Hefei 230039,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥230039

出　　处：《宿州学院学报》2023年第2期43-49,共7页Journal of Suzhou University

基　　金：安徽省高校人文社会科学研究重点项目(SK2019A0018)。

摘　　要：文章构建了一个职业经理人市场上信息不对称程度的测度模型(双边随机前沿模型),研究职业经理人市场中经理人与企业博弈双方掌握的信息程度对经理人薪酬的影响效应进行实证研究。结果发现:(1)在经理人和企业达成薪酬契约的过程中,信息不对称具有不可忽视的影响,原因在于企业比经理人掌握更多的信息而拥有更强的议价能力;(2)大部分的经理人不得不接受一个低于基准薪酬的价格,平均而言最后博弈双方达成的薪酬比公正的基准薪酬低3.85%;(3)年度效应分析结果中发现2016—2021年,职业经理人的薪酬大致比基准薪酬低4%左右。This paper constructs a model to measure the degree of information asymmetry in the professional mana-gers market(bilateral stochastic frontier model).In the professional managers market,the empirical research is conducted on the influence of the information degree of the game between the managers and the enterprises on the ma-nager compensation.The results find:(1)In the process of compensation contract between managers and enterprises,information asymmetry has a non-negligible impact.The reason is that enterprises have more information and stronger bargaining power than managers.(2)Most managers have to accept a price lower than the benchmark salary.On average,the final salary reached by the two game parties is 3.85%lower than the fair benchmark salary.(3)The annual effect analysis results show that from 2016 to 2021,the salary of professional managers is roughly 4%lower than the benchmark salary.

关 键 词：信息不对称 薪酬议价 职业经理人 完全竞争市场 双边随机前沿模型 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]