企业社会责任与CEO薪酬——有效激励还是以权谋私?  

CSR and CEO Compensation——Effective Incentive or Abusing Power for Personal Gain?

作　　者：毛志宏[1] 王司阳 林煜恩 Mao Zhihong;Wang Siyang;Lin Yuen(School of Business and Management,Jilin University,Changchun 130012,China)

机构地区：[1]吉林大学商学与管理学院,吉林长春130012

出　　处：《数量经济研究》2023年第2期53-83,共31页The Journal of Quantitative Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“中国经济周期波动的转折点识别、阶段转换及预警研究”(71573105);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地项目“‘十三五’期间中国增长型经济波动态势与宏观调控模式研究”(16JJD790014)的联合资助。

摘　　要：本文以2010~2020年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了上市公司履行企业社会责任与CEO薪酬之间的关系。研究发现,企业承担社会责任对CEO有“保护伞”作用,即降低了CEO变更对公司绩效的敏感度,并加强了CEO任期延长所带来的“年资效应”,从而最终提高了CEO薪酬。并且,本文证明了企业承担社会责任并不是CEO以权谋私的具体体现。进一步分析发现,基于企业社会责任的CEO薪酬激励可以提升企业的财务绩效和创新绩效,在非一线城市的企业中这种提升作用更为显著。研究结论为企业履行社会责任对CEO薪酬的影响效果提供了新的经验证据,同时也为进一步鼓励企业履行社会责任及监管机构规范企业社会责任的披露提供了政策依据。This paper examines the relationship between corporate social responsibility and CEO compensation for listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2020.It is found that corporate social responsibility has an“umbrella”effect on CEOs,i.e.,it reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover to corporate performance,strengthens the“seniority effect”brought by the extension of CEO tenure,and ultimately increases CEO compensation.Moreover,it demonstrates that corporate social responsibility is not a specific manifestation of CEO’s abusing power for personal gain.Further analysis reveals that CEO compensation incentives based on CSR can improve financial performance and innovation performance,and this improvement is more significant in non-Tier 1 cities.The findings of the study provide new empirical evidence on the impact of corporate social responsibility on CEO compensation,and also provide a policy basis for further encouraging companies to perform corporate social responsibility and regulators to regulate CSR disclosure.

关 键 词：企业社会责任 CEO 薪酬 公司绩效 年资效应 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理]