数理逻辑下维特根斯坦的可说与不可说问题探究  

An Inquiry into Wittgenstein’s“What Can Be Said”and“What Cannot Be Said”Under Mathematical Logic

作　　者：黄恩浩 Huang Enhao(School of Marxism,Guangxi University,Nanning 530004)

机构地区：[1]广西大学马克思主义学院,南宁530004

出　　处：《西部学刊》2023年第13期58-61,共4页Journal of Western

摘　　要：维特根斯坦在其著作《逻辑哲学论》中对语言本身的规范性进行了探究,意图通过逻辑图示的提出明确可说与不可说部分的界限。对此问题的探究,通过数理逻辑的方式,以集合和图象的说明方式,分别从概念本身和反证法两个方面论证了该界限本身存在的矛盾性,但这种矛盾性只是针对界限的明确性而言,也就是说,并不存在这样一种“公式”可以将所有可说的说清楚,而这种可说与不可说的分类方式却是成立的,也是合理的。由此可以得出一个结论,即可说与不可说是存在的但不是分离的,如果将二者完全剥离开就会陷入二元对立的矛盾中,对于世界而言,可说与不可说在同一件事物上的表现形式是混杂的、复合的,这也是维特根斯坦后期为何转入语言游戏的猜想之一。In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,Wittgenstein explored the normativity of language itself,with the intention of clarifying the boundary between“what can be said”and“what cannot be said”by means of logical illustrations.In this paper,the paradoxical nature of the boundary itself is demonstrated from concepts and antinomies by means of mathematical logic,sets and images,but this paradoxical nature is only with regard to the clarity of the boundary,that is to say,there is no such“formula”that can make“what can be said”clearly,and this classification of“what can be said”and“what cannot be said”is correct and rational.From this,we can conclude that they exist but are not separate,and if they are completely separated,we will fall into the contradiction of dichotomy,and for the world,“what can be said”and“what cannot be said”is mixed and compounded in the same thing,which is one of the reasons for Wittgenstein’s turn to the language game in his later period.

关 键 词：维特根斯坦 《逻辑哲学论》 逻辑图示 数理逻辑 可说与不可说 

分 类 号：B521[哲学宗教—外国哲学]