薪酬政策、经营业绩与国有上市公司高管薪酬——基于国有上市公司分类的实证研究  

Compensation Policy,Performance and Executive Compensation of State-owned Listed Companies:An empirical research based on the classification of state-owned listed companies

作　　者：何玲雁 HE Lingyan(School of Management,Guangzhou Huashang College,Guangzhou 511300,China)

机构地区：[1]广州华商学院管理学院,广州511300

出　　处：《科技和产业》2023年第12期136-141,共6页Science Technology and Industry

摘　　要：国有企业员工薪酬体系优化与员工激励机制建设一直是国企改革的重点。为此,对高管薪酬制度现状以及国有企业高管薪酬政策等相关文献进行系统分析,梳理影响国有上市公司高管薪酬的因素,建立面板数据分析模型,选取2010—2020年中国国有上市公司样本,探究不同类型的国有上市公司高管薪酬与经营业绩、薪酬政策的关系。研究发现,高管薪酬政策与经营业绩对两种类型的国有上市公司的高管薪酬具有显著的正向影响。基于研究结论,从政府薪酬管制、公司治理、增强高管薪酬的业绩敏感性、改进薪酬激励的方式等角度,分别对两类国有上市公司提出管理建议。The optimization of the employee compensation system and the construction of the employee incentive mechanism in state-owned enterprises have always been the focus of deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises.The current situation of executive compensation system and the relevant literature of executive compensation policies of state-owned enterprises are systematically analyzed,the factors affecting executive compensation of state-owned listed companies are sort out.Based on panel data analysis model,and selecting samples of Chinese state-owned listed companies from 2010 to 2020,the relationship between executive compensation,business performance and compensation policies of different types of state-owned listed companies is explored.It is found that executive compensation policies and business performance have a significant positive impact on executive compensation of the two types of state-owned listed companies.Based on the research conclusions,management suggestions for the two types of state-owned listed companies are put forward from the perspectives of government compensation control,corporate governance,enhancing performance sensitivity of executive compensation,and improving the way of compensation incentive.

关 键 词：国有上市公司 薪酬激励 公司业绩 面板模型 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]