任人唯亲:企业家大饥荒经历与家族企业治理行为研究  

Cronyism: Entrepreneurs Experience of the Great Famine and Family Business Governance

作　　者：许为宾[1] 唐青舟 王锁龄 Xu Weibin;Tang Qingzhou;Wang Suoling(Business School,Guizhou University,Guiyang,550025)

机构地区：[1]贵州大学管理学院,贵阳550025

出　　处：《珞珈管理评论》2023年第4期1-29,共29页Luojia Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“历史的延续:家族涉入的家族化起源依赖与家族企业创新行为研究”(项目批准号:72262006);国家自然科学基金项目“家族企业控制权配置的社会阶层烙印与企业投资‘脱实向虚’”(项目批准号:71862006)。

摘　　要：任人唯亲的家族化治理模式在中国家族企业中普遍存在,本文依据高阶理论、烙印理论,从企业家个人特质入手,实证检验了企业家大饥荒经历对家族企业治理任人唯亲行为的影响。研究发现:(1)早年经历过大饥荒时期的企业家,其家族企业任人唯亲的行为更为突出。(2)企业家的高等教育经历和体制内工作经历可以明显削弱其大饥荒经历与家族企业治理任人唯亲行为之间的关系。(3)企业家大饥荒经历与家族企业治理任人唯亲行为之间的正向关系,在法律环境较差地区和社会信任较低地区更显著。本研究为深化关于“家族化治理模式如何形成”问题的理论认识,提供了一个差异化的解构逻辑。The familial governance model of favoritism is widely present in Chinese family business.Based on the higher-order theory and branding theory,this article empirically tests the impact of the entrepreneur s experience of the Great Famine on the favoritism behavior in family business governance,starting from the individual characteristics of entrepreneurs.Research has found that:(1)Entrepreneurs who experienced the Great Famine in their early years have a more prominent behavior of favoritism in their family businesses.(2)Entrepreneurial higher education and institutional work experience can significantly weaken the relationship between their experiences of famine and cronyism in family business governance.(3)The positive relationship between the entrepreneurial famine experience and the cronyism behavior in family business governance is more significant in areas with poor legal environment and low social trust.This study provides a different deconstruction logic for deepening the theoretical understanding of how the family governance model is formed.

关 键 词：大饥荒经历 高阶理论 烙印理论 家族企业 任人唯亲 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]