代理冲突、内外薪酬差距与并购商誉  

Agency Conflicts,Salary Gaps and Goodwill in Mergers and Acquisitions

作　　者：陈耿[1,2] 严彩红 CHEN Geng;YAN Caihong(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China;the Innovation Institute of Corporate Finance&Accounting Governance,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China;Business Bureau of Deyang Economic and Technological Development Zone,Deyang 618000,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [2]重庆大学公司财务与会计治理创新研究院,重庆400030 [3]四川德阳经济技术开发区商务局,四川德阳618000

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2023年第4期53-62,共10页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：2019重庆大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项项目(2019CDSKXYJG0037);2020重庆大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项项目(2020CDJSK02PT15);2022年度重庆市教委人文社会科学研究项目(22SKJD002)。

摘　　要：以2012—2020年A股上市公司为研究样本,以商誉的准则规定为基础,从管理层代理冲突与内外薪酬差距角度研究商誉的形成机制、影响因素及经济后果。实证结果表明,管理层代理冲突越严重,企业通过并购形成的商誉规模越大。提高内部薪酬差距可以弱化代理冲突与并购商誉规模之间的正相关关系,发挥治理作用;而对于外部薪酬差距,正向差距不会产生明显影响,负向差距越大越会加剧代理冲突与商誉规模之间的正相关关系。进一步研究发现,代理冲突越严重的公司,其商誉越有可能在后续出现大额减值现象,并对公司绩效产生负面影响。研究结论有助于进一步从代理冲突及管理层薪酬结构的视角客观认识商誉在形成过程中受到的影响,帮助企业从优化内外薪酬差距的角度来约束商誉中非合理部分的形成,降低企业风险。This paper researches on the formation mechanism and influencing factors from the perspective of management agency conflict and internal/external compensation gap based on the samples of A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2020.Empirical test shows that the more serious the agency conflict,the larger the goodwill scale formed through M&A.Increasing the internal compensation gap can alleviate the relationship between agent conflict and goodwill scale.The positive external compensation gap does not have a significant impact.However,the negative external gap aggravates the positive relationship between agent conflict and goodwill scale.Further research shows that the company with worse agency problem is more likely to experience goodwill impairment and a negative performance during the subsequent period.The findings can help enterprises to restrain the formation of the non-reasonable part of goodwill in order to reduce risks.

关 键 词：代理冲突 并购商誉 管理层薪酬 薪酬差距 公司绩效 企业风险 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]