皮尔士实用主义准则的意义问题  

On the Problem of Meaning in Peirce’s Maxim of Pragmatism

作　　者：卢德平[1] LU Deping

机构地区：[1]北京语言大学语言学系

出　　处：《哲学分析》2023年第4期38-47,196,共11页Philosophical Analysis

基　　金：北京语言大学“中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金”(项目编号:17ZDJ01)(重大基础研究专项《对外汉语教育史研究》)。

摘　　要：皮尔士实用主义准则的意义,具有从观念到信念,从信念到习惯,从习惯到行动,从行动到对象效果的过程性和区分性特征。意义的实质在于区分中的创新。“任何观念其全部意义存在于可构想的实际效果之中”所反映的实用主义意义特征,说明了关于对象的认知从抽象的知识转向了具体的实践。这种转向是让知识适用于具体语境下的对象,在知识和语境的“无间道”界面生成了新的意义。新的意义是对“直接解释项”既有知识的补充和增容,同时在转化为“最终解释项”时,转变为新的知识。这是皮尔士实用主义意义观的精髓所在。Meaning in Piece’s maxim of pragmatism possesses the characteristics of process anddifferentiation,which may be specified as both the process of transforming concept to belief,belief to habit,habitto act,and act to effect of object and the differentiation between such dimensions of process.Meaning in natureis defined as innovation from differentiation.Features of meaning as reflected in the maxim“the entire meaning and significance of any conception lies in its conceivably practical bearings”informs that cognition of objecthas changed from abstract knowledge to concrete practice.Such change is to apply knowledge to the object inconcrete situation,and thus generate new meaning in the“in-between”interface of knowledge and context.Thenew meaning intends to supplement and enrich the existing knowledge of“immediate interpretant”,and through“final interpretant”transform the existing knowledge into the new one.This should be taken as the essentialpoint of the meaning in Piece’s maxim of pragmatism.

关 键 词：实用主义准则 意义 过程性 区分性 知识 

分 类 号：B71[哲学宗教—外国哲学]